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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“I was early voting… and when I parked my car, I figured out 
something that it would take the rest of the country another week to 
figure out. I understood that Donald Trump was going to be our next 
president. Because in Ohio, unlike DC, you could see the results in the 
parking lot… all these … pickup trucks and tractors…And then I 
walked up, and I saw a long, long line … of dusty white people”  
- Dave Chappelle, Equanimity 
 
Partisan identity is a particularly salient cleavage in the American political environment. 
The psychological attachment individuals have to their party, whether the result of policy opinions 
or affect, has played a central role in the American public’s political attitudes and behavior (Bartels 
2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Huddy, Mason and Aaroe 2015), 
and has recently bled into apolitical environments as well. Partisans have, in the past decade or so, 
begun to engage in partisan bias and discrimination in apolitical environments. They express 
positive attitudes towards and favor co-partisans and express negative attitudes and prejudice 
toward opposing partisans (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar et al. 2018).  
Partisans discriminate based off others’ partisan identity in a variety of different 
hypothetical or real contexts largely in part because partisan discrimination is not only socially 
accepted but often encouraged (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Both politicians and partisan 
commentators frequently spend time denigrating the other party: calling them deplorable (Reilly 
2016) or comparing opposing partisans to historically evil and unfavorable groups (Berry and 
Sobieraj 2014). This language from group elites creates an environment in which social norms 
against partisan discrimination are non-existent, unlike social norms against racial or gender 
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discrimination. Thus, it is perceived as acceptable for everyday Americans to engage in 
discrimination of an individual solely from their partisan group membership. It is perhaps 
fortunate, then, that partisan identity (and associated issue positions) is not easily attainable 
information in most contexts. Most people tend to avoid political discussion on a daily basis (Mutz 
2006), and few people wear a name tag that says “Democrat” or “Republican.” 
However, as Dave Chappelle points out in his description of 2016 early voting in Ohio, 
even when you don’t know someone’s partisan identity you can still categorize and stereotype 
individuals by party. Through increased sorting between social groups and the two political parties 
(Mason 2018), the cultural symbols used to impute social group membership can now be used to 
impute partisan membership, provided the social group is uniquely associated with only one party.  
Not only do people recognize that the two parties are distinctly comprised of different 
social groups but they actively extend in-group favoritism and out-group animosity towards co-
partisan and opposing partisan social groups, respectively (Mason et al. 2018; Miller et al. 1992). 
Democrats express positive feelings towards social groups that fall under the Democratic partisan 
coalition absent partisan labels, and so do Republicans.  
One problem with these studies though is that they measure group affect bluntly, through 
survey questions and feeling thermometer ratings of social groups. This is not necessarily a 
realistic way in which people learn about and evaluate others’ identities. People do not necessarily 
go around introducing themselves as their social groups. Instead, we pick up cues from how people 
look and act, what they like to talk about, and the things that they own (Gosling et al. 2002; 
Rentfrow and Gosling 2006). Instead of learning about people’s social identities via sterile social 
group proper nouns, we decode their lifestyle choices and preferences to decipher who they are 
and to which groups they belong (Gosling et al. 2002). Therefore, we use the cultural symbols 
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attached to these social groups to impute social group membership, and provided that that social 
group is uniquely associated with only one political party, to also impute partisan membership. As 
such, some everyday cultural preferences, like driving a pickup truck instead of a Volvo, wearing 
camouflage instead of a basketball jersey, and listening to rap music not country music, are 
partisan cultural stereotypes.  
In this dissertation, I argue that partisan cultural stereotypes are omnipresent. Basic 
information about individuals’ hobbies and preferences is easily available and obvious information 
about people. This information can be communicated to others through many different processes. 
Two of the primary ways in which an observer “learns” about a person are through visual or verbal 
pieces of information (Lampel and Anderson 1968). Visual pieces of information are typically 
communicated through physical appearance and can be observed simply by looking at someone, 
whether in a photograph or in person (Ambady and Rosenthal 1992; Levy and Richter 1963). If 
someone is wearing a cowboy hat, people might automatically impute that they are from a rural 
area of the country and that they are a Republican. Thus, if a person’s clothing choices, hair style, 
and general physical style are associated with a specific partisan social group then people can 
impute partisan identity simply by looking at someone.  
Besides visual pieces of information, people can signal aspects about themselves through 
verbal or written communication (Lampel and Anderson 1968). Indeed, cultural preferences, like 
music, movies, and hobbies, are often the first things people talk about when getting to know others 
(Rentfrow and Gosling 2006), and if these cultural preferences are connected to partisan identity, 
learning this information can activate partisan categorization of an individual in small talk 
situations or casual “getting-to-know-you” environments.  
Through either of these “learning” processes, people can use the cultural attributes and 
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preferences of others, in everyday social scenarios, to infer their partisan preferences and formulate 
a broader impression of strangers around this perception of partisanship. I argue that this initial 
impression can shape any number of social evaluations, such as where to sit on the bus, in which 
neighborhood to live, whom to recommend for a promotion, and which candidate to vote for in 
low-information elections. By just seeing or meeting someone, people might immediately engage 
in partisan categorization and prejudice without knowing anything else about them. If perceived 
partisan identity shapes these daily experiences and interactions with strangers around partisan 
bias, these minor interactions will continue to foster negative attitudes towards the opposing party 
and affective polarization, simply through increased physical distance between the two partisan 
groups in daily interactions.  
My dissertation research involves four related articles that all focus on the concept of 
partisan cultural stereotypes. Through these four articles I answer three central questions: do 
partisan cultural stereotypes exists, how are they formed, and what are their social implications? 
Drawing on theories from political science and psychology, I use a variety of experimental and 
psychological methods to analyze how partisan identity plays a role in day-to-day social 
evaluations and interactions in the United States.  
In the first paper of my dissertation, I conduct an initial test of the relationship between 
cultural preferences and partisan stereotypes. First, I conduct a categorization task using an 
undergraduate sample to demonstrate that certain cultural preferences are seen as highly typical of 
one of the two parties, and that some of these cultural preferences are seen as more typical of one 
of the two parties than issue positions and partisan news media sources. Building off the results of 
this categorization task, I conduct a nationally representative survey experiment to assess whether 
learning about a stranger’s cultural preferences is related to partisan social evaluations of that 
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individual. In this 2 by 3 experimental design, respondents read a vignette about either a 
hypothetical co-worker or non-partisan political candidate’s cultural preferences and daily lives. 
The results from this experimental study suggest that if the cultural preferences of either the co-
worker or candidate are connected to one party, that respondents are more likely to categorize and 
stereotype that individual as the “correct” partisan. Furthermore, partisans are also more likely to 
express partisan discrimination towards an individual that is seen as stereotypical of their opposing 
party.  
In the second paper of my dissertation, I test the breadth of the effect of cultural preferences 
on partisan discrimination through two experimental studies. In the first study, I conduct an 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) and find that both partisan categorization and partisan bias occur 
automatically and subconsciously when exposed to cultural preferences. These findings suggest 
that these social group cultural symbols and the party images are cognitively linked in long-term 
memory, and that partisan identity and associated affective tags can be activated when exposed to 
cultural preferences. In the second study, I test whether this implicit partisan bias extends to 
explicit partisan bias by replicating and expanding the second experimental study from the first 
paper. I find that regardless of which apolitical environment and what type of social evaluation, 
partisans express partisan discrimination against stereotypical opposing partisans.  
In the third paper, I assess whether partisan identity can be visually communicated. As 
mentioned above, information about an individual or their identity can be communicated through 
multiple pathways. In the previous two papers, I evaluated whether partisan identity can be 
perceived through written communication about an individual. In this paper, I evaluate whether 
partisan identity, through partisan cultural stereotypes like clothing choice and physical style, can 
be perceived by just looking at someone. In the first part of this paper, I test whether one’s physical 
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appearance affects the partisan perception and initial impressions of an individual through a 
randomized and timed categorization task. The findings from this study suggest that clothing styles 
and appearance significantly alter the partisan perception of an individual and that partisan identity 
can be inferred from visual cues. In the second half of this paper, I show that these visual 
manifestations of partisan identity also affect social evaluations of complete strangers, as both 
Democrats and Republicans engage in partisan social evaluations of individuals who look 
stereotypical of their in-party and out-party. Furthermore, partisan discrimination is, to some 
extent, moderated by socio-economic status differences within the two parties. 
The last paper of this dissertation evaluates one mechanism through which partisan cultural 
stereotypes form and come to be systematic: public knowledge. I argue that it is through the 
growing intersection of culture and politics, namely the endorsement of politicians by celebrities 
and politicians’ lifestyle preferences, that people learn to distinctly associate certain cultural 
preferences with one of the two political parties. I test this theory in two ways. First, I trace Taylor 
Swift’s evolution from a staunchly apolitical celebrity to a supporter of two Tennessee Democrats 
and use original survey data to assess how her behavior has affected partisan categorization of her 
and her fans. I find that while her behavior slightly shifted respondent’s partisan categorization of 
her towards more typical Democrat, her behavior did not shift respondents’ categorization of her 
fans. Second, I conduct an experiment to more directly test what happens when people are aware 
of either celebrity or partisan exemplar behavior. I find that when respondents learn about either a 
celebrity endorsing a partisan politician or a partisan exemplar endorsing a celebrity, they are more 
likely to categorize and stereotype a fan of the celebrity as a Republican or Democrat, depending 
on the partisan politician mentioned in the treatment. When people are aware of the cultural 
behavior of a politician or the partisan behavior of a celebrity, associative learning begins to take 
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place and partisan cultural stereotypes form.  
This dissertation project is an in-depth study of how the concept and definition of partisan 
identity has evolved as the two partisan coalitions have become socially and culturally distinct. 
Advances in technology and production have drastically increased the availability of consumer’s 
options across a broad array of products and have thus made social group membership more visible 
through increased symbolic consumption. Industrialization and economic development coupled 
with globalization has drastically increased Americans consumption options from radio programs, 
to grocery stores, to hobbies, to potato chips – basically every choice one makes throughout the 
day. It is this choice that allows individuals to specifically tailor their consumption behavior to 
their self and social identity, creating a more cohesive concept of identity (Heffetz 2009, Elliot and 
Wattanasuwan 2015). If they wish to, social group members can use their consumption patterns to 
intentionally express who they are and what they stand for. Christians can now listen to Christian 
radio, environmentalists can now choose to drive more environmentally friendly cars, and 
individuals with predilections towards meditation and spirituality can practice yoga even if they 
live in the middle of rural Kansas. Thus, social group identity can be easily expressed through 
consumption choices as well as easily seen and inferred from consumption choices.  
When coupled with the emergence of hyper polarization and the resulting salience of 
partisan identity, social group symbolic consumption and intentional expressions of social group 
identity can also be interpreted as symbolic consumption and the intentional expression of partisan 
identity. As a result, we now live in an era where people can easily infer social and partisan group 
identity from intentional consumption choices. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE CONTENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF PARTISAN CULTURAL STEREOTYPES 
 
ABSTRACT: People routinely use their knowledge of others’ partisanship, when present, to make 
social evaluations in political and apolitical settings. Most social situations, however, do not focus 
on partisan identification nor issue positions. In this paper, I argue that, despite this informational 
shortfall, people may still engage in partisan prejudice by using information about others’ habits 
and hobbies, provided such cultural preferences are associated with one party or the other. Using 
two studies, I find, first, that respondents systematically recognize many cultural preferences as 
associated with a particular party; and, second, that they use these connections to categorize and 
stereotype others as partisans. Also, and most importantly, I demonstrate that people use cultural 
preferences to express prejudice against out-group partisans in both non-partisan political and 
apolitical settings. Thus, not only is politics relevant to citizens’ everyday lives, but citizens use 
information from everyday life to navigate the political and social world. 
 
 
 When an interviewer meets a job candidate wearing an expensive suit and belongs to a 
country club, does she assume the interviewee is a Republican? What about when a real estate 
agent meets a client who drives a Subaru and carries a bag from the local farmer’s market? Does 
she perceive this woman to be a Democrat? If so, do these seemingly apolitical but in fact political 
cues affect how the interviewer and real estate agent evaluate and interact with these individuals? 
Simply observing people’s personal lives can allow others to make assumptions about partisanship 
that bleed into otherwise apolitical situations. As a result, partisan bias can shape everyday 
apolitical judgements and interactions, as easily as it can political ones.  
 I use the term partisan cultural stereotypes to capture how cultural symbols of social, ethnic, 
and cultural groups have become fused with partisanship. Building on theories of partisan 
coalitions and reference groups (Green et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1991), I argue that as certain social 
groups have become closely associated with the two parties, a broad range of group-associated 
symbols have also become part of the partisan stereotypes. For example, “rural whites” is one 
group in the Republican Party coalition. Rural whites are associated in the public’s mind with an 
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array of cultural symbols, one of which is the television show Duck Dynasty. Thus, learning that 
someone likes to watch Duck Dynasty may not only signal social group membership but also 
partisanship.  
 Images and rhetoric connecting cultural symbols and partisanship are popular. An ad 
attacked Howard Dean during the 2004 presidential primary by calling him a “latte-drinking, 
sushi-eating, Volvo-driving …left-wing freak show…” (Anderson and Hook 2004). In addition, 
newspaper articles frequently connect partisanship with food, drink, and television preferences 
(Nededog 2016; Wasserman 2014; Wilson 2013). Microtargeting campaigns know these cultural 
habits are important to politics, as they use them to predict Americans’ political leanings and voting 
habits (Brennan 2012). Although the association between certain cultural attributes and 
partisanship is recognized among political elites, it remains unclear how such connections operate 
among the mass public. Specifically, do citizens perceive these cultural attributes as partisan 
stereotypes and, if so, how do these seemingly innocuous, even mundane, pieces of information 
affect people’s everyday evaluations of and social interactions with others? 
 The answer to this question is normatively important. Partisanship is a critical societal 
cleavage in the United States (Green et al. 2002). Especially in these more polarized times, 
evidence suggests that people increasingly want to engage with co-partisans and avoid out-
partisans (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). It is perhaps fortunate, then, that 
partisanship (and associated issue positions) is not easily attainable information in most contexts. 
Most people tend to avoid political discussion on a daily basis (Mutz 2006), and few people wear 
a name tag that says “Democrat” or “Republican.” Partisan cultural stereotypes, however, are 
omnipresent. People can easily see cultural markers, such as wearing Birkenstocks, a crew cut, or 
a cross around one’s neck. Indeed, cultural preferences, like music, movies, sports, and hobbies, 
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are often among the first things people talk about when getting to know others (Gosling 2008; 
Renfrow and Gosling 2006). Because people can readily observe these cultural symbols, it is 
possible, even likely, that they can easily collect, process, and absorb this information to make 
inferences about partisanship. This initial impression can, in turn, shape any number of social 
evaluations, such as where to sit on the bus, in which neighborhood to live, whom to recommend 
for a promotion as well as which candidate to vote for in low-information elections. By just seeing 
or meeting someone, people might immediately engage in partisan categorization and stereotyping 
without knowing anything else about these individuals.  
 In this paper, I develop the concept of partisan cultural stereotypes and test it using two 
different studies. First, I establish that they exist in the minds of voters. Across 30 different cultural 
symbols, including food, music preferences, and hobbies, people agree that these cultural 
characteristics are stereotypical of the two parties. People even believe some cultural 
characteristics are more stereotypical than well-known partisan issue positions, namely abortion. 
Next, I demonstrate that these partisan cultural stereotypes lead to partisan categorization and 
stereotyping of hypothetical individuals, which, in turn, affect social evaluations in both a non-
partisan political context and an apolitical context. Specifically, when respondents learn about a 
candidate (or co-worker) whose cultural preferences signal that they belong to a different party, 
respondents are less likely to vote for the candidate or recommend the co-worker. Overall, I find 
that individuals see everyday information about people’s habits and cultural preferences as signals 
of people’s partisanship, and they use these signals to make decisions about support in both non-
partisan political and apolitical settings. 
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Conceptualizing Partisan Cultural Stereotypes 
 
To simplify the social world, humans automatically and subconsciously categorize 
individuals into social groups by observing their exhibited group-associated characteristics, or 
group stereotypes (Brewer 1999; Dovidio et al. 1986). Whether real, exaggerated, or inaccurate, 
these stereotypes are widely held beliefs about a group’s defining characteristics (Hilton and von 
Hippel 1996). By comparing an individual to a group’s prototype, or the summary representation 
of stereotypes (Smith and Zarate 1990), people can not only engage in group categorization but 
also, through the application of other group stereotypes, infer a wealth of information about an 
otherwise unknown individual (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Furthermore, once categorization 
and stereotyping occurs, the resulting group-based impression is quite stable and can affect how 
subsequent information about an individual is processed (Fiske 1998; Lodge and Taber 2013). 
Thus, simply from meeting or seeing someone for the first time, people can form relatively 
complete and enduring impressions of others as group members, which they can use to simplify 
both social interactions and everyday decisions.1  
People develop social group prototypes for a wide array of different groups, including 
Democrats and Republicans. As the summary representation of exaggerated or even false 
characteristics associated with the two parties, these partisan prototypes encompass a variety of 
stereotypical partisan attributes. The most germane aspect of the partisan prototype to my work is 
the well-known relationship between parties and the social groups that “belong” to each party 
(Green et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1991). Because parties are associated with social groups and 
                                                 
1 Ambady and Rosenthal (1992) find that impressions formed after observing someone for several 
minutes are equally as predictive and accurate as impressions formed after observing someone for 
less than a minute. 
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because social groups have certain identifying symbols, I argue that these group symbols have, 
themselves, become part of the partisan prototypes. However, unlike other partisan stereotypes, 
these cultural symbols enable partisan categorization akin to how skin color enables racial 
categorization. Since they are easily visible or introductory details, exposure to seemingly 
mundane, prima facie apolitical, information about someone’s hobbies or cultural preferences can 
lead to partisan categorization and stereotyping almost immediately. If partisan categorization 
occurs as I hypothesize, it can then potentially lead to partisan prejudice without any explicitly 
partisan information being expressed. 
Partisan coalitions incorporate groups from seemingly all aspects of social life, from 
economic to racial to religious factions, dividing Americans at the level of basic core values 
(Hunter 1991). Republicans are increasingly white, male, religiously orthodox, and rural. 
Democrats, on the other hand, are increasingly ethnically diverse, female, morally progressive, 
and urban (Hunter 1991; Pew Research Center 2016). Especially with the sharp partisan divide, 
the public recognizes most social groups as belonging to only one of the two parties (Miller and 
Wlezien 1993; Miller et al. 1991), contributing to the images people have of prototypical partisans 
(Green et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1991).  
One way to identify group membership is through group symbols. Symbols have long been 
used by religious organizations and nations as group identifiers, simultaneously providing a 
statement about their beliefs as well as differentiating themselves from other groups. Beyond 
religion and national identity, group symbols can be used to identify members of a broad array of 
groups (Firth 1973; Geisler 2005). For example, wearing a cross might suggest that a person is 
religious, while belonging to a country club might suggest that a person is affluent. Likewise, 
activities such as watching foreign films or practicing yoga may identify someone as a member of 
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the “creative class” (Florida 2002; Infante 2015), a group that is defined more by personality traits 
and cultural predispositions. From any of these cultural symbols, people can easily categorize 
others into the appropriate social group and, if the group is distinctly associated with one political 
party, by party. Thus, belonging to a country club might suggest not only that someone is affluent 
but also that she is a Republican, and watching foreign films might suggest that someone is a 
member of the creative class and, thus, a Democrat.  
 This allows people to use the cultural symbols associated with a wide variety of groups not 
only to decide whether a person is culturally like him or her but also to presume whether that 
person is a political friend or foe. Of course, not every cultural symbol is a partisan cultural 
stereotype. Some cultural symbols are not clearly associated with specific groups. Hobbies like 
running and watching football, for example, cut across a wide range of group identities, and, as 
such, people would not be able to impute partisanship from them. Other cultural preferences are 
associated with one group, but these groups are not clearly connected to one political party. For 
example, because groups like white women and Catholics are not necessarily distinctly part of a 
single partisan coalition (Pew Research Center 2016), the cultural symbols associated with them 
ought not to convey enough partisan information for them to become partisan cultural stereotypes. 
In short, a cultural symbol must be distinctly associated with a group that is distinctly associated 
with one of the two parties for it to become a partisan cultural stereotype. 
 If I can demonstrate that they exist, what are the implications? Recent work on affective 
polarization has established that when people know the partisan identity of others, partisans tend 
to favor co-partisans and express animosity towards members of the opposite party, even 
sometimes encouraging outright discrimination (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; 
Nicholson et al. 2016). As troubling as this may be, the fact that people do not come to know 
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people’s partisanship immediately mitigates these potential negative consequences. Indeed, people 
rarely share partisan information with each other unless they are already close personal friends or 
family (Mutz 2006). However, partisan cultural stereotypes do not even require people to express 
anything explicitly about politics to make political inferences. Hence, one does not even need to 
know another’s partisanship to treat them like an in-partisan or out-partisan. People can perceive 
partisanship through observing partisan cultural stereotypes and use this assumed information to 
select into pleasant interactions and avoid those who are perceived to be not politically like them. 
In addition, the familiarity of these cultural symbols makes them relatively easy to recognize, 
comprehend, and absorb compared to other more complex partisan stereotypes, like issue 
positions. As such, partisan categorization, through simply observing or meeting someone, can 
influence impression-formation almost immediately. Perceived partisanship, then, becomes a filter 
through which all subsequent interactions might be processed. As a result, these partisan cultural 
stereotypes could lead to expressions of partisan bias in a variety of both political and apolitical 
settings. However, since political contexts in America prime partisan identity, I expect that the 
strength of the expression of partisan bias will be greater in a political context than in an apolitical 
context.  
 
The Content of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes 
 
To test whether people associate cultural symbols with the two political parties, I conducted 
a laboratory study with 220 undergraduates in the fall of 2015. Participants were randomly 
assigned to complete one of two classification tasks, both of which asked participants to classify 
30 characteristics by party. Fifteen of the characteristics were ex-ante posited to be typical of 
Democrats and 15 characteristics were ex-ante thought to be typical of Republicans. 
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The characteristics tested consisted mostly of the cultural symbols associated with social 
groups in the partisan coalitions. For instance, two characteristics are music preferences: hip-hop 
and country music. I chose these two genres because they are symbols commonly associated with 
African Americans and rural whites, social groups that are associated with the Democratic Party 
and Republican Party, respectively (Kotkin 2012; Miller et al. 1991). I included country clubs and 
golf because each is a cultural symbol of the upper-class, a key constituency of the GOP (Miller 
et al. 1991; Pew Research Center 2016). The symbols yoga and foreign films are included because 
they are symbols of the creative class, a social group associated with the Democratic Party (Carney 
et al. 2008). Like most stereotype content, it does not necessarily matter if these stereotypes are 
accurate of group or party members; simply believing these characteristics are associated with a 
group can facilitate the formation of a cognitive connection.  
The other characteristics included are social groups and well-known partisan political 
characteristics. The social groups used are responses mentioned frequently in the American 
National Election Study (ANES) during the party likes and dislikes open-ended questions. The 
political characteristics are two issue positions on the polarized issue of abortion (pro-life and pro-
choice) (Fingerhut 2017) and two cable news networks (MSNBC and Fox News). The political 
characteristics are included to provide a baseline against which the strength of the association 
between cultural characteristics and partisanship can be compared.2 
Half the subjects completed a categorization task, in which they categorized, as quickly as 
possible, each of the 30 characteristics by party. In this task, respondents were randomly presented 
                                                 
2 The characteristics are: hunting, big business, Fox News, southern, steakhouses, country clubs, 
golf, country music, Duck Dynasty, rural, action movies, Evangelicals, affluent, pro-life, SUVs, 
farmer's market, working class, Subarus, New England, rock climbing, low income, The Daily 
Show, pro-choice, urban, MSNBC, atheists, yoga, vegan restaurants, foreign films, and hip-hop. 
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with one characteristic at a time in the middle of the computer screen. The names of the two parties 
appeared in the top two corners, with one in each corner. To categorize the characteristic, 
participants had to press one of two keys on the keyboard.3 This was repeated until respondents 
categorized all 30 characteristics. The other half of the sample completed a typicality task that 
required subjects to rate the same 30 characteristics using a six-point scale of partisan typicality 
that ranged from very typical Democrat to very typical Republican.4  
I used two different classification tasks in order to capture two different aspects of social 
categorization. The categorization task is intended to mimic the automaticity of social 
categorization in daily interactions, and measures how people react to the simple exposure of a 
cultural attribute. The typicality task, on the other hand, is used to capture just how exemplary (or 
not) each attribute is of one of the partisan stereotypes, and, as such, can provide insight into which 
attributes are seen as more or less strongly associated with each party image. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Instructions for this task as well as a screen shot of this task are in the Appendix A.  
4 The question wording was: "Please rate whether you think this characteristic is typical of 
Republicans or typical of Democrats. If you think this characteristic is typical of both Republicans 
and Democrats please select the group you think it is MORE typical of. When thinking about these 
characteristics please think about the political parties' cultural stereotypes and try not to base your 
thoughts on personal beliefs." The response options were very typical Democrat, typical Democrat, 
somewhat typical Democrat, somewhat typical Republican, typical Republican, and very typical 
Republican. This language is taken from previous work on stereotype content (see Devine 1989). 
In addition, respondents produce similar answers when asked to make judgments based off 
personal beliefs and when asked to make judgments based off cultural stereotypes (Krueger 1996). 
  
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Mean Categorization Rating with 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Mean Typicality Rating with 95% Confidence Interval 
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 Figures 1a and 1b show the average rating, with 95% confidence intervals around the mean, 
of each of the 30 characteristics in the categorization task and the typicality task, respectively. For 
both tasks, the responses are recoded to range from -1 to 1. Values closer to -1 indicate that 
participants, on average, associate this characteristic with “Democrat,” and values closer to 1 
indicate that this characteristic is, on average, more associated with “Republican.”5 
Figures 1a and 1b show that in both tasks, all 30 characteristics were classified “correctly.” 
Respondents, on average, categorized characteristics that were ex-ante believed to be associated 
with Republicans and Democrats as “Republican” and “Democrat,” respectively. Thus, 
participants perceive these 30 characteristics as solidly part of at least one partisan stereotype.6 
Within the 30 characteristics, however, there is variation in the extent to which certain cultural 
symbols are seen as typical of the two parties. This variation in associative strength is clearly seen 
in the typicality task results. Symbols like hip-hop and vegan restaurant are firmly thought to be 
Democratic attributes whereas driving a Subaru and going to the farmer’s market, while still 
perceived to be Democratic, are seen as comparatively less indicative of Democrats. Likewise, 
characteristics like hunting and country music are perceived as distinctly Republican while being 
affluent and driving an SUV are thought of as somewhat less typical. Thus, upon exposure, all of 
these 30 characteristics are seen as indicators of partisanship, yet, respondents perceive some 
attributes as more indicative of partisanship than others. 
These results also suggest that learning certain cultural information may activate partisan 
categorization more crisply than learning some partisan political information. Indeed, respondents 
                                                 
5 Boxplots of the distribution of responses in each task are in the Appendix A.  
6 These results do not change significantly when looking at the mean categorization or typicality 
ratings by respondent partisanship.  
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classified some cultural characteristics as more typical of a party than the four explicitly political 
attributes. Hip-hop, foreign films, and vegan restaurants are, on average, perceived as more 
indicative of Democrats than MSNBC and pro-choice in the categorization task. Even more 
striking, about half of the Republican cultural characteristics are perceived as more distinctly 
Republican than being pro-life across both tasks, while hunting and big business are seen as more 
Republican than watching Fox News in the categorization task. Extant work on partisan 
stereotypes emphasizes the strong link between issues and the two parties (Egan 2013), and the 
public perceives MSNBC and Fox News as bastions of partisanship (Pew Research Center 2009). 
Yet, these results suggest that people might see certain cultural characteristics as more indicative 
of party membership that either of these types of partisan political habits.  
To further demonstrate the extent to which respondents see these cultural symbols as part 
of the two partisan stereotypes, I recorded how quickly respondents who completed the 
categorization task classified each of the 30 characteristics. Categorization in social interactions is 
an automatic process that happens due to linked cognitive associations in long-term memory 
(Allport 1954; Hilton and von Hippel 1996). As such, scholars often use response time in 
subconscious categorization tasks to measure the strength of cognitive associations between group 
characteristics and groups, with quicker response times indicative of stronger cognitive 
connections (Fazio and Olson 2003). Here, I use the response time in a conscious categorization 
task to approximate the association between cultural symbols and partisanship. 
The mean categorization time for each characteristic was very quick, and respondents were 
able to categorize the cultural and political characteristics at similar speeds.7 Indeed, relative to 
                                                 
7 The mean categorization time for each of the 30 characteristics is in the Appendix A. 
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direct and easily identifiable partisan political symbols, cultural symbols are categorized by 
partisanship just as, if not more, quickly. Thus, it is not more cognitively taxing for respondents to 
categorize cultural characteristics than political characteristics by party, indicating that partisan 
cultural stereotypes may be just as closely associated with the partisan images people hold in their 
heads as partisan political stereotypes. 
 Overall, the results from this initial study validate the idea that people do associate these 
cultural symbols with the two parties and that such symbols are, across different tasks, clearly 
identified as belonging to one of the two parties. In addition, these results indicate that respondents 
have stronger partisan associations with some cultural symbols than some explicitly political 
characteristics, a finding that is suggestive of the salience and strength of these cultural symbols 
in people’s images of the two parties. The results of this study demonstrate that people actively 
and systematically perceive certain cultural symbols as central to partisan stereotypes, and that the 
association between these apolitical traits and partisanship exists beyond correlations mentioned 
in popular discourse. Given this, there is the potential that, even if people do not talk about politics 
(Mutz 2006) and politicians obfuscate their policy positions (Conover and Feldman 1984), people 
may use these partisan cultural stereotypes to make immediate social evaluations of otherwise 
unknown individuals through partisan categorization.   
 
The Consequences of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes 
 
To understand whether people use these apolitical attributes to make partisan based social 
evaluations, I designed a biography vignette experiment. This study was conducted online in the 
spring of 2016, with data collected by Survey Sampling International (SSI). The study, in which 
1,200 SSI panel recruits participated, was described as a survey about political attitudes and 
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behaviors. In order to participate, respondents had to be U.S. citizens, to be 18 years of age or 
older, and to identify as partisans or partisan leaners.8   
Respondents first completed a series of demographic questions. Next, they were randomly 
assigned to read one of six biographies about a hypothetical individual. Three of the biographies 
related to a non-partisan political context: a candidate in a local election for the office of county 
supervisor. The other three biographies related to an apolitical context: a co-worker up for 
promotion. Within each context, one biography was stereotypical of the Democratic Party, the 
Republican Party, or neither. The partisan cultural stereotypes from Study 1 were used to create 
the two “partisan” biographies. The control biography consisted of cultural preferences that could 
be related to a variety of different social, racial, or cultural groups, and thus, are not distinctly 
associated with any social group distinctly associated with a party. The content of the three 
biographies did not vary across candidate and co-worker contexts.  
 The individual in each treatment was a man named “Michael Lange”; as such, the sex and 
the implied race of the target were held constant across all six treatments. Each of the biographies 
about Mr. Lange included five pieces of information and are modeled after candidate information 
from in a real non-partisan election (Littman 2015). The biographies included information about 
his occupation, his location of residence, and three of his hobbies. All information in the treatment 
was apolitical, no info about issue positions or partisan labels was included, to both isolate the 
effect of partisan cultural stereotypes on partisan bias as well as resemble the type of information 
                                                 
8 SSI invited participants to take the study by sending their panel subjects an email with a link 
attached. I asked SSI to only recruit partisans and partisan leaners because the study focuses on 
partisan intergroup dynamics and independents do not have a clear out-party. Besides a 50/50 
sample split between Republicans and Democrats, the survey targeted census demographic 
distributions on race, age, gender, education levels, and census region.  
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one might learn upon initially meeting someone. The specific wording of the six treatments appears 
in the Appendix A.  
 Immediately following exposure to a treatment, respondents reported his or her likelihood 
of supporting Mr. Lange. Participants who received a candidate treatment were asked about their 
likelihood of voting for him, and respondents who received a co-worker treatment reported their 
likelihood of recommending him for a promotion. Responses to these two questions are combined 
into one variable, Support, which ranges from 0 (very unlikely) to 1 (very likely).9    
 
Partisan Categorization 
 
Before analyzing the effect of these partisan cultural stereotypes on support, I examine 
whether Mr. Lange’s cultural preferences did indeed trigger partisan categorization. In one of the 
last questions in the survey, after answering Support, respondents were asked to categorize Mr. 
Lange as a Democrat, Independent, or Republican.10 This variable, Perceived Partisanship, ranges 
from -1 (Democrat) to 1 (Republican), with Independent placed at 0.  
Figure 2a and 2b display the distribution of Perceived Partisanship across the three 
treatments in the candidate context (Figure 2a) and the co-worker context (Figure 2b). Two results 
are of note. First, the majority of respondents perceived the “Democrat” and “Republican” Mr. 
Lange as a Democrat and Republican, respectively. 57% of respondents who received the 
“Democrat” candidate and 51% of respondents who received the “Democrat” co-worker 
                                                 
9 The question wording is: “Based on the information you just read, how likely are you to [vote 
for Mr. Lange for county supervisor/recommend Mr. Lange as your project manager for a year-
long work project]?” 
10 The question wording is: “Which political party do you think Mr. Lange belongs to? Please 
make an educated guess if you are unsure.”  
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categorized Mr. Lange as a Democrat. Similarly, 64% of respondents who received the 
“Republican” candidate perceived him as a Republican, and 60% of respondents categorized the 
“Republican” co-worker as a Republican. In addition, for both control treatments there is no 
majority consensus on Mr. Lange’s perceived partisanship.  
 
Figure 2a. Distribution of Perceived Partisanship by Candidate Treatment 
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Figure 2b. Distribution of Perceived Partisanship by Co-Worker Treatment 
 
Second, partisan categorization is, essentially, the same across the two contexts. The 
distribution of Perceived Partisanship for the two “Democrat” biographies and the two 
“Republican” biographies are statistically identical.11 In addition, the mean of Perceived 
Partisanship for the “Democrat” candidate (Mcandidatee = -0.30) is not statistically distinguishable from 
the mean of Perceived Partisanship for the “Democratic” co-worker (Mco-worker = -0.28). This is also 
the case for the two “Republican” biographies (Mcandidate = 0.40; Mco-worker = 0.31) and the two control 
biographies (Mcandidatee = 0.04; Mco-worker = 0.06). Overall, the results from this analysis further 
substantiate the results of Study 1 by demonstrating, in another format and among a more 
representative sample, that people can and do use this connection between the apolitical and 
                                                 
11 A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions produces a D-
value of 0.0340 (p = 0.901), which suggests that the distribution of Perceived Partisanship is not 
significantly different across the candidate and co-worker contexts. 
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political to engage in partisan categorization when only given apolitical information. 
 
Partisan Stereotyping 
 
Categorization and stereotyping are two separate, but related, processes. While 
categorization does not always lead to the application and use of stereotypes (Devine 1989; Macrae 
et al. 1994), when it does, people are more likely to formulate an extreme and prototypical 
perception of group members (Devine 1989; Rahn 1993). As a result, people are remembered as 
just another group member and not a unique individual. I use this section to test whether the 
partisan categorization of Mr. Lange leads to the subsequent application of partisan stereotypes 
beyond the information presented in the vignettes.  
I use two different measures of partisan stereotyping: cultural attribution and issue 
placement. The first measures whether respondents remember Mr. Lange enjoying other partisan 
consistent cultural stereotypes not mentioned in the biographies as well as reject partisan 
inconsistent cultural stereotypes. The second measure assesses whether respondents extend their 
stereotyping to make stereotypical political judgments about Mr. Lange’s issue positions. If 
stereotype application does occur, then, for example, I would expect that a respondent who reads 
about a “Democratic” Mr. Lange to falsely recall that he also prefers other “Democratic” partisan 
cultural stereotypes that were not mentioned in the treatments. In addition, I would also expect that 
respondents would also impute that this “Democratic” Mr. Lange holds liberal policy positions, 
even though no explicit political information was provided about him.  
First, I test the extent to which respondents engage in partisan cultural stereotyping beyond 
the information in the treatments. The last survey question asked respondents to recall information 
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about Mr. Lange and identify which attributes described him.12 From the response to this question, 
I created two measures that captured the extent to which respondents applied stereotypes not 
mentioned in the treatments to Mr. Lange. Both measures were created by adding the same two 
components together: assignment of three new Republican (Democratic) attributes not mentioned 
in the treatments and rejection of seven Democratic (Republican) attributes.13 I then subtracted the 
measure of Democratic typicality from the measure of Republican typicality to create the variable 
Cultural Stereotype Application, which ranges from -1 to 1. More positive values of this variable 
indicate that the respondent holds a stronger representation in memory of Mr. Lange as a 
stereotypical Republican, whereas more negative values indicate that the participant holds a 
stronger representation of him as a stereotypical Democrat. 
I regressed Cultural Stereotype Application on two treatment dummy variables, 
“Democrat” Treatment, which is coded as 1 if the candidate or co-worker is stereotypical of the 
Democratic Party, 0 otherwise, and “Republican” Treatment, which is coded as 1 if the candidate 
or co-worker is stereotypical of the Republican Party, 0 otherwise. Both of these two treatment 
                                                 
12 The question wording for this question was: “Lastly, we would like to ask you some questions 
about Mr. Lange. Below is a list of attributes. If you think the attribute describes him select ‘Yes, 
that describes him.’ If you think the attribute does not describe him please select ‘No, that does 
not describe him.’ Please complete each item.” 
13 This list of 20 attributes consisted of 8 attributes associated with each of the two parties (4 from 
the treatment and 4 not from the treatment) and the 4 attributes mentioned in the control. The four 
additional Democratic attributes were: “Is a Democrat,” “Eats at Vegan Restaurants,” “Drives a 
Subaru,” and “Spends time at a Farmer’s Market.” The four additional Republican attributes were: 
“Is a Republican,” “Eats at a Steakhouse,” “Drives an SUV,” and “Spends time at the country 
club.” In the final analysis, I only looked at the attributes not mentioned in a treatment and 
excluded “Is a Democrat” and “Is a Republican” since respondents had already categorized Mr. 
Lange by party in a previous question. The results of the analysis do not change if I include these 
two partisan attributes. In addition, I analyze the two components of Cultural Stereotype 
Application as separate dependent variables in the Appendix A. The results of the analysis do not 
change when looking at these two components separately. 
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variables are interacted with the dummy variable Co-Worker Scenario, coded 1 for those who 
received a treatment about a co-worker, to account for possible differences in stereotyping by 
context. The OLS regression also controls for basic demographic characteristics such as partisan 
identification, age, race, gender, education, and level of income. 
The results in Table 1, model 1 show that respondents engage in partisan stereotyping when 
they remember information about both the candidate and the co-worker. The coefficient for 
“Democrat” Treatment is negative and significant, suggesting that participants who received this 
treatment are significantly less likely to stereotype this individual as a Republican compared to the 
control by -0.36 (p < 0.01). In other words, those who received a treatment about a man who lives 
in the city and watches comedy movies are more likely to remember him as enjoying additional 
Democratic cultural stereotypes not mentioned in the treatment and disliking Republican cultural 
stereotypes. Partisan stereotyping similarly occurs when assessing the effect of “Republican” 
Treatment on Cultural Stereotype Application. Participants who received this treatment are 
significantly more likely to remember this individual as stereotypical of the Republican Party 
compared to those who received the control treatment by 0.32 (p < 0.01), or about three additional 
consistent Republican stereotypes. In addition, neither treatment effect on Cultural Stereotype 
Application differs significantly between the political and apolitical contexts, which suggests that 
partisan stereotype application occurs regardless of context.  
Building from these results, I test the extent to which respondents move beyond partisan 
cultural stereotypes and engage in partisan stereotyping when it comes to issue positions. After 
respondents received the treatment and answered whether they would support Mr. Lange, 
respondents placed both the candidate or co-worker on a series of issues. Placement on abortion, 
government spending, and aid to minorities were averaged to create the variable Political 
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Stereotype Application.14 The variable ranges from -1 to 1, where more negative values indicate 
more liberal issue positions and more positive values indicate more conservative positions. 
Table 1, model 2 shows that exposure to partisan-associated cultural attributes does indeed 
lead to partisan stereotyping on issue positions. Participants who received a “Democratic” 
treatment are significantly more likely to think that the target has more liberal policy views 
compared to the control by about -0.12 (p < 0.01). Similarly, participants who received a 
“Republican” treatment are significantly more likely to perceive that the target maintains, on 
average, more conservative policy positions compared to the control by 0.26 (p < 0.01). Like the 
application of partisan cultural stereotypes, the application of stereotypical partisan issue positions 
does not differ significantly between the non-partisan political and the apolitical contexts. Thus, 
respondents also engage in partisan stereotyping when it comes to both candidate placement and 
co-worker placement on issue positions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 I included four issues total: abortion, government spending, aid to minorities, and gun control. I 
excluded responses to the gun control issue question in the final analysis since the Republican 
treatments feature a hunter who presumably uses guns. Therefore, all issue positions included in 
Issue Placement avoid information related to, but not mentioned, in the treatment. The results of 
the analysis do not change when I include responses to the gun control issue question. The three 
issue positions used scale together with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.49 for the “Republican” 
treatments, 0.36 for the “Democrat” treatments, and 0.38 for the control treatments. 
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Table 1.  The Effect of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes on Social Judgments 
 
 Cultural Stereotype 
Application 
Political Stereotype 
Application 
 (1) (2) 
“Republican” Treatment 0.32*** 0.26*** 
        (0.03) (0.04) 
“Democrat” Treatment -0.36*** -0.12*** 
        (0.04) (0.04) 
“Republican” Treatment *  0.01 0.02 
Co-Worker Scenario (0.05) (0.06) 
“Democrat” Treatment * -0.04 -0.07 
 Co-Worker Scenario (0.05) (0.06) 
Co-Worker Scenario -0.02 0.02 
               (0.04) (0.04) 
Republican  -0.01 0.03 
               (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.00 -0.01 
               (0.02) (0.02) 
Non-White -0.04 -0.04 
               (0.03) (0.03) 
Education  -0.03 -0.07 
               (0.05) (0.06) 
Income  0.01 0.01 
               (0.04) (0.04) 
Age: 18-29  -0.10 0.01 
               (0.08) (0.09) 
Age: 30-39 -0.11 0.03 
               (0.08) (0.09) 
Age: 40-49 -0.08 0.10 
               (0.08) (0.09) 
Age: 50 - 64 -0.09 0.03 
               (0.08) (0.09) 
Intercept 0.22** -0.05 
               (0.09) (0.10) 
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.17 
N  1124 1124 
Both dependent variables are coded from -1 (Democrat) to +1 (Republican). 
OLS coefficients with standard errors below. 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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The results from these two models suggest that respondents do engage in partisan 
stereotyping in addition to partisan categorization. When asked to describe either the candidate or 
co-worker, respondents draw from prior, stored knowledge about party members rather than 
remember specific details about Mr. Lange. Not only does this occur when respondents are asked 
about other cultural attributes, but also when they are asked about political attributes. Thus, 
exposure to only partisan cultural stereotypes can lead to stereotyping even among non-cultural 
partisan attributes, albeit to a lesser degree. Overall, the results from these two tests suggest that 
respondents’ impressions of the candidates and co-workers revolve around a broad view of them 
as partisan caricatures. As such, these stereotypical views should subsequently guide respondents’ 
social evaluations of these hypothetical individuals. 
 
Cultural Stereotypes and Partisan Bias 
 
I next examine the implications of partisan cultural stereotypes on social evaluations. In 
particular, I look at whether exposure to certain cultural attributes triggers bias in favor of 
suspected co-partisans and against suspected opposing partisans.  
I regress the dependent variable Support on two partisan treatment variables, “In-Party” 
Treatment and “Out-Party” Treatment. Each treatment variable is also interacted with the dummy 
variable Co-Worker Scenario to account for heterogeneous effects by context. Lastly, in order to 
control for any possible differences in expressed support between Democrats and Republicans, I 
also subset the sample by respondent partisanship. I include controls for demographics such as 
age, race, gender, education, and level of income as well.  
Table 2 shows that among both Democrats and Republicans, exposure to the “Out-Party” 
Treatment significantly decreases the likelihood that a respondent will express support in the non-
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partisan election context. In addition, the interaction term, “Out-Party” Treatment * Co-Worker 
Scenario, suggests that both Democrats and Republicans differentiate between political and 
apolitical contexts when it comes to expressions of partisan prejudice. Figure 3a and Figure 3b 
plot the predicted level of support for the out-party treatments, by context, among Democrats and 
Republicans, respectively.  
In both the non-partisan political and apolitical contexts, Democrats are significantly less 
likely to support an individual who is perceived, through only apolitical information, to be a 
member of the opposing party compared to the respective control conditions. However, as Figure 
3a shows, the magnitude of animus is significantly larger in the political (albeit non-partisan) 
context by about 11 percentage points. Democratic respondents are significantly less likely to 
support a candidate who likes to hunt and is an investment banker by -0.20 (p < 0.01), compared 
to the control candidate. Democrats are also less likely to support a co-worker who likes to hunt 
and was an investment banker by -0.09 (p < 0.01), compared to the co-worker treatment. 
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Table 2.  The Effect of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes on Support 
 
 Among 
Democrats 
Among 
Republicans 
 (1) (2) 
“In-Party” Treatment 0.01 -0.02 
        (0.04) (0.04) 
“Out-Party” Treatment -0.20*** -0.11*** 
        (0.03) (0.04) 
“In-Party” Treatment * 0.02 -0.01 
Co-Worker Scenario (0.05) (0.05) 
“Out-Party” Treatment * 0.11** 0.10* 
Co-Worker Scenario (0.05) (0.05) 
Co-Worker Scenario 0.03 0.03 
               (0.03) (0.04) 
Female -0.04* -0.02 
               (0.02) (0.02) 
Non-White -0.00 0.03 
               (0.02) (0.03) 
Education -0.02 -0.10** 
               (0.05) (0.05) 
Income -0.01 -0.00 
               (0.04) (0.04) 
Age: 18-29  -0.00 0.06 
               (0.08) (0.08) 
Age: 30-39  0.03 0.09 
               (0.08) (0.08) 
Age: 40-49  -0.06 0.02 
               (0.08) (0.08) 
Age: 50-64  -0.07 0.04 
               (0.08) (0.08) 
Intercept 0.70*** 0.67*** 
               (0.09) (0.09) 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.03 
N  543 581 
Support is coded from 0 (very unlikely) to 1 (very likely). 
OLS coefficients with standard errors below. 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
  
 In both the non-partisan political and apolitical contexts, Democrats are significantly less 
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likely to support an individual who is perceived, through only apolitical information, to be a 
member of the opposing party compared to the respective control conditions. However, as Figure 
3a shows, the magnitude of animus is significantly larger in the political (albeit non-partisan) 
context by about 11 percentage points. Democratic respondents are significantly less likely to 
support a candidate who likes to hunt and is an investment banker by -0.20 (p < 0.01), compared 
to the control candidate. Democrats are also less likely to support a co-worker who likes to hunt 
and was an investment banker by -0.09 (p < 0.01), compared to the co-worker treatment.  
 
 
Figure 3a: Predicted Support of “Out-Party” Treatment Conditional on Context Among 
Democrats 
 
 
Republican respondents are also significantly less likely to support Mr. Lange if they 
perceive him to be a member of the out-party, but only in the non-partisan electoral environment. 
When faced with voting for a yoga-practicing professor, Republicans are significantly less likely 
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to vote for this candidate by -0.11 (p < 0.01), compared to the control. Yet, as Figure 3b shows, 
when faced with recommending a yoga-practicing ex-professor for a promotion, there is no 
significant nor substantive difference in the likelihood of expressed support for this co-worker 
compared to the control co-worker. The marginal effect of receiving “Out-Party” Treatment 
conditional on Co-Worker Scenario is -0.018 (p-value = 0.621).15  
 
Figure 3b: Predicted Support of “Out-Party” Treatment Conditional on Context Among 
Republicans 
 
 Despite this relatively consistent out-party effect on support, there is not a significant in-
                                                 
15 For all three of the significant “Out-Party” Treatment effects on Support, I conducted a test for 
mediation by Perceived Partisanship. In the candidate context, the results of a Sobel test report 
that Perceived Partisanship mediates 20% of the effect of “Out-Party” Treatment on Support 
among Democrats (Z = -3.101, p-value < 0.01). Among Republicans in the candidate context, 
Perceived Partisanship significantly mediates about 43% of the treatment effect (Z = -3.21, p 
<0.00). For Democrats in the co-worker condition, Perceived Partisanship mediates about 23% (Z 
= -2.313, p < 0.05) of the effect of “Out-Party” Treatment on Support.  
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party effect among either Democratic or Republican respondents. Neither group of partisans is 
significantly more likely to support the “In-Party” Treatment compared to the control in either 
context. Generally speaking, these results point to the relative motivational power of negative 
information compared to positive information (Baumeister et al. 2001). Respondents significantly 
alter their support only upon receiving information about a person perceived to be a member of 
the disliked, opposing party. Specifically regarding partisanship, these results provide further 
evidence of the relative strength of out-party effects compared to in-party effects (Iyengar and 
Westwood 2015; Nicholson 2012) as well as highlight the strength of out-party animosity as a 
source of motivation in the current American political environment (Bump 2016). Overall, these 
results suggest that apolitical information can trigger expressions of partisan bias in both political 
and apolitical scenarios, when minimal information is present and partisan information is absent.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 I have demonstrated here that aspects of everyday life are themselves inherently political. 
Individuals use non-political information – apolitical, cultural, and social preferences – to routinely 
categorize others into partisan camps and, then, make partisan based social judgments in a variety 
of settings. As such, cultural attributes, like taste in movies and music, are more than just exciting 
preference correlates of partisanship. People view specific cultural symbols as typical attributes of 
the party stereotypes, and, in this role, these apolitical traits are cognitive attached to a wealth of 
political information that may be inferred upon immediately seeing or meeting someone. As such, 
party becomes a salient and influential identity in everyday situations, through which people can 
make social evaluations as well as avoid perceived unpleasant and uncomfortable interactions. 
Thus, not only is politics relevant in citizens’ everyday lives, but citizens use mundane information 
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from their daily lives to navigate the political and social world. 
 Study 1 validates the concept of partisan cultural stereotypes with evidence that people view 
specific cultural symbols as typical of Democrats or Republicans. These results suggest, through 
multiple measures of partisan typicality, that people have a robust cognitive association between 
these cultural symbols and partisanship. These apolitical attributes are perceived to be part of at 
least one of the two partisan stereotypes. In fact, these apolitical characteristics are seen as just as 
stereotypical as overtly and polarized political attributes, such as issue positions and partisan cable 
news. Thus, it is entirely possible that cultural symbols are just as central to the mass public’s 
images of the two parties as political attributes.  
 Next, I show that when introduced to a hypothetical candidate or co-worker and provided 
with only apolitical information about them, respondents form mental images of these individuals 
as partisans. Not only do they engage in partisan categorization but they also apply other partisan 
stereotypes, like unmentioned cultural attributes and issue positions, when making judgments 
about these individuals. Even when given only apolitical information, people perceive others as 
partisans and use this categorization to formulate a broader understanding of this individual.  
 Lastly, these partisan cultural stereotypes influence social evaluations in both non-partisan 
political and apolitical contexts. When a Democrat is introduced to a hypothetical candidate or co-
worker who possesses cultural preferences typical of her out-party, she is less likely to support the 
candidate or co-worker. When a Republican learns that a hypothetical candidate possesses cultural 
preferences typical of her out-party, she is less likely to support the candidate. Overall, these results 
demonstrate that when given only apolitical information about an individual, an experience similar 
to meeting someone for the first time, people engage in partisan categorization and express partisan 
bias against perceived out-partisans.  
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 Democrats, however, are more consistent in their partisan bias across different environments. 
One potential explanation for this difference could be that Republicans believe that politics do not 
belong in social and apolitical settings. Recently, Republican politicians and media personalities 
have admonished the politicization of events like the Super Bowl (Nolte 2017), the Oscars (FOX 
News Insider 2017), and even television shows (Domenech 2017). Texas Governor Greg Abbott 
went so far as to tell the NFL to “get the heck out of politics” after they suggested that the Texas 
“Bathroom Bill” might affect the likelihood of the NFL holding future events in the state (Boren 
2017). Republicans feel that this politicization not only brings politics into an environment in 
which it does not belong but also ruins the respite from political and social conflict that these 
events provide (Domenech 2017). Perhaps it is this desire for a clean separation between the 
political and apolitical that drives the null effect of partisan cultural stereotypes on Republicans’ 
expression of co-worker support.  
 Overall, people perceive specific cultural attributes as central parts of both the Democratic 
and Republican stereotypes. Due to these connections, people can use perceived partisanship to 
make evaluations in a plethora of scenarios without observing or acquiring anything more than 
introductory information about others; like what they are wearing or what type of music they 
prefer. Thus, through merely seeing or meeting someone, people can engage in partisan 
categorization and stereotyping, which can not only shape initial person perception but also 
influence the subsequent interactions and social evaluations that may follow. 
 As demonstrated, these partisan cultural stereotypes can be useful in making quick, albeit 
potentially more inaccurate, decisions in both political and apolitical situations. In political 
scenarios, the majority of American elections are low-information elections (Kam and Zechmeister 
2013), where partisan information is limited, and issue positions reflect local concerns rather than 
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national party platforms. In these elections, the cultural symbols of candidates can be readily 
available and easily interpreted information that can guide voters toward decisions based on 
inferences of partisanship. Compared to spending time deciphering candidates’ opinions on local 
traffic concerns or cost of living, learning that a candidate used to be a hedge fund CEO or is 
married to a local university professor can make vote choice in these elections less cumbersome. 
These cultural attributes may also be quite useful in apolitical scenarios as well. When making 
time-consuming decisions, like choosing which neighborhood to live in, or simple everyday 
decisions, such as where to sit on the bus, these partisan cultural stereotypes could potentially lead 
people towards outcomes that are, at least on the surface, seen as more culturally and politically 
pleasant. Overall, these partisan cultural stereotypes can be beneficial by helping people make 
quick decisions in a variety of scenarios. These decisions, however, may not be as accurate as 
actually learning a candidate’s positions or detailed information about a neighborhood.  
 Even though people can use these cultural preferences to make decisions quickly, this 
perpetual categorization can further entrench the perception of the other side as exaggerated and 
extreme partisans. When people use stereotypes as a cognitive shortcut, they rely on this perceived 
prototypicality to make social decisions, ignoring or even avoiding unique information about an 
individual (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Despite the fact that both parties encompass a diverse 
coalition of individuals, categorization and stereotyping perpetuates the idea that group members 
are essentially partisan caricatures. Furthermore, since social norms do not discourage partisan 
discrimination, people are not pressured into moderating their partisan based prejudice. Without 
this motivation to control bias, people will continue to use partisan cultural stereotypes to make 
expeditious but potentially discriminatory decisions on a daily basis - not eating lunch with a 
perceived out-partisan co-worker, not tipping a perceived out-party waiter, or, even, not holding 
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an elevator for a complete stranger who exhibits out-partisan symbols. These daily discriminatory 
occurrences could not only affect our perception and understanding of people as members of a 
political party but also could ultimately have broader implications for the general erosion of 
cooperation and respect across party lines.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
POLITICS ALL AROUND US: PARTISAN CULTURAL STEREOTYPES AND 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
ABSTRACT: Partisan groups are charged with affective components, and when partisanship is 
known, partisan affect can shape attitudes and behaviors toward co-partisans and members of the 
opposite party. Yet explicit mentions of partisanship are a rare event in everyday interactions, as 
people tend to shy away from talking politics. In this paper, I look to build on work about partisan 
stereotypes and partisan prejudice by looking at how partisan cultural stereotypes, or everyday 
habits and hobbies associated with the parties, can influence both the spontaneous and deliberative 
expressions of partisan bias. First, using an implicit measure of partisan affect, I show that these 
cultural symbols can facilitate the automatic activation of polarized partisan affect just like explicit 
partisan symbols. Second, in a separate study I find that spontaneous partisan affect can translate 
to deliberate expressions of partisan bias in a variety of contexts as well. These results are 
suggestive of a broader finding that partisan identity, and politics in general, plays a larger, subtler 
role in information processing by automatically eliciting partisan affect as well as directing 
conscious social judgements without ever being mentioned.  
 
Imagine you are in an elevator and right before the door is about to close, someone wearing 
a NASCAR hat and golf shoes, and carrying take out from a local steakhouse comes running to 
catch the elevator. What would you do? How would you immediately react, would you help this 
individual or “fail” to press the open-door button in time? How would you behave if they made it 
into the elevator? Would you start up a conversation with them or just keep your eyes glued to the 
floor? What about if this individual was wearing an indie band t-shirt, carrying rock-climbing gear, 
and a yoga mat instead?  
While these clothing styles, sports preferences, and exercise gear might seem like mundane 
objects, these apolitical attributes are actually associated with the mental images people have of 
Republicans and Democrats, respectively. They are partisan cultural stereotypes, and reflect how 
certain cultural symbols of social, ethnic, and cultural groups have become fused with partisanship. 
Hints of the association between the political and apolitical are common in marketing reports 
regarding drinking habits, restaurant preferences, and television viewership (Wasserman 2014; 
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Wilson 2013), not to mention micro-targeting campaigns that focus on people’s cultural habits to 
predict their partisanship, social group membership, and likelihood of voting (Brennan 2012).   
The association between these cultural stereotypes and partisanship is important because, 
even though partisanship is a critical societal cleavage in the United States (Green et al. 2002) that 
shapes both political (Bartels 2000; Mason 2015; Nicholson 2012) and apolitical outcomes 
(Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Nicholson et al. 2016) along partisan group 
lines, explicitly partisan labels (and associated issue positions) often are not readily available 
information about anyone, outside of a partisan election. Exacerbating this void, moreover, is the 
fact that most people tend to avoid political discussion on a daily basis (Mutz 2006). Partisan 
cultural stereotypes, however, can fill this void, and can function as more accessible attributes of 
the partisan stereotype since they tend to be easily-visible symbols, such as clothing choice or hair 
style, and come up naturally in conversation, such as when people talk about what they did over 
the weekend, what television shows they watch, or even what they ate for lunch.  
Building on theories about partisan coalitions and reference groups, I argue that these 
cultural symbols associated with social, ideological, and cultural groups, have become key aspects 
of partisan stereotypes. As such, cultural preferences like listening to hip-hop, playing golf, and 
watching foreign films are now cognitively linked to partisanship in long term memory, and can 
cause people to automatically engage in partisan categorization. As a result of this partisan 
categorization, these partisan cultural stereotypes might then cause both spontaneous and 
deliberative expressions of partisan prejudice. First, these partisan cultural stereotypes can 
potentially lead to the automatic facilitation of polarized partisan affect as the network of partisan 
related cognitive associations is activated in long term memory. Second, since there is a general 
lack of motivation to curtail overt partisan bias among the American public (Iyengar and 
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Westwood 2015) exposure to these partisan cultural stereotypes can also potentially shape 
deliberative expressions of partisan prejudice through daily social evaluations, such as where to 
sit on the bus, which neighborhood to live in, and whom to recommend for a promotion.  
In this paper, I look to broaden the discussion of partisan prejudice through assessing the 
impact of partisan cultural stereotypes on both spontaneous and deliberative expressions of 
partisan bias. I build this argument first by showing that partisan affect is strongly associated with 
and automatically activated by these partisan cultural stereotypes. I show through implicit 
measures of partisan affect, that both partisan cultural stereotypes and overt partisan symbols 
facilitate similar, if not identical, levels of automatic and uncontrolled expressions of polarized 
partisan affect. In a second study, I demonstrate that these partisan cultural stereotypes affect 
deliberate social judgments in both a non-partisan political context and apolitical contexts. When 
presented with an individual whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of the opposing party, 
partisans use partisan categorization to express partisan discrimination in a variety of different 
types of social evaluations and social contexts.  
 
Stereotypes and Partisanship 
 
To simplify the social world, humans automatically categorize individuals into social 
groups based on group associated characteristics (Brewer 1999; Dovidio et al. 1986; Rosch 1975). 
Because these group characteristics and category labels are a cognitive network of linked attributes 
in long term memory (Lepore and Brown 1997), that are consistently associated with each other 
in society, they become a “well-learned set of associations” (Devine 1989, p. 6). As a result, 
exposure to group related characteristics can facilitate the automatic activation of group labels, 
which in turn can facilitate the activation of other group related cognitive links, such as group 
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stereotypes, feelings towards the group, or opinions about the group (Devine 1989; Kam 2007; 
Lodge and Taber 2013; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Because of this process of categorization 
and subsequent stereotyping, individuals can infer a veritable wealth of information from the mere 
presence of a social group member.   
This process of social categorization is largely a reflection of the social group prototype, 
because this prototype provides a template of comparison for the categorization process. The 
prototype is a summary representation of group characteristics and associations, which becomes 
emblematic of what a group member should be like. If a target individual exhibits any of these 
characteristics seen as prototypical, she is more likely to be categorized and stereotyped as a 
member of that group (Smith and Zarate 1990).  
People have images of what prototypical Democrats and Republicans look like, which they 
can use to categorize candidates and peers into neat partisan categories. Of the many aspects of the 
partisan prototype, the most germane to my work is the well-known relationship between parties 
and their coalitions, specifically which social groups “belong” in which political party (Mason 
2018; Miller et al. 1991). The public distinctly recognizes many varied types of social groups as 
belonging to at least one of the two parties (Miller et al. 1991; Miller and Wlezien 1993), and this 
distinct partisan association in turn informs people’s mental images of the prototypical partisan. 
Because Democrats are more urban, less affluent, more ethnically diverse, more female and hold 
more progressive values, a prototypical Democrat is perceived to be more urban, less affluent,  
more ethnically diverse, more female and hold more progressive moral orientations. By 
comparison, a prototypical Republican is seen as more rural, more affluent, whiter, more male, 
and more traditionally religious (Green et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1991). Since these social groups 
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are part of the partisan prototype, learning that someone is a member of a social group can 
automatically lead to the partisan categorization of that individual.  
One way to identify social, cultural, or ideological group membership is through group 
symbols. Symbols have long been used by religious organizations and nations as group identifiers, 
simultaneously providing a statement about an individual’s beliefs as well as differentiating her 
from other groups (Firth 1973; Geisler 2005). For example, wearing a cross might suggest that a 
person is religious, while living in a big house might suggest that a person is affluent. From these 
symbols, people can easily categorize others by the appropriate social groups and, if the social 
group is closely associated with a political party, by appropriate political party, if the context 
warrants it. Thus, living in a big house might not only suggest that someone is affluent, but also 
that she is a Republican. Whereas having more “artsy” or “cultured” tastes like watching 
independent films, drinking artisan coffee, or going to book readings might not only result in the 
categorization of an individual as a member of the “creative class” (Carney et al. 2008; Infante 
2015), but also as a member of the Democratic Party. In general, these symbols may not only be 
used to distinguish whether people are culturally like you or not, but also whether people are 
politically like you or not.  
Taking everything into account, because parties are identified with social groups and social 
groups are associated with certain cultural symbols, parties become connected with these cultural 
symbols. As a result, exposure to cultural and apolitical symbols associated with these social 
groups can automatically lead to partisan categorization.  
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Partisan Cultural Stereotypes and Spontaneous versus Deliberative Partisan Affect 
 
 Through the process of partisan categorization, due to exposure to these partisan cultural 
stereotypes, partisanship becomes a central factor in guiding attitude expression and behavior. 
Specifically, because of partisanship’s role in today’s polarized political environment, partisan 
identity can elicit intergroup bias as a social identity (Huddy et al. 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 
2015). As a social identity, the salience of partisanship can bring out strong in-group favoritism 
towards co-partisans as well as animosity towards the opposite party. Thus, exposure to partisan 
cultural stereotypes can potentially elicit expressions of partisan prejudice. However, the extent to 
which these cultural stereotypes shape both automatic (or subconscious) and controlled (or 
conscious) expressions of partisan prejudice depends on individual level motivations (Devine 
1989).  
When partisanship is salient, cognitive and affective components that are strongly 
associated with partisanship can be automatically and uncontrollably activated in long term 
memory (Burdein et al. 2006). The association between affect and partisanship are particularly 
linked in long term memory and deeply ingrained in people’s minds (Burdein et al. 2006; Iyengar 
and Westwood 2015). Implicit measures of partisan affect suggest that not only do individuals 
have strong cognitive associations between positive affect and their party and negative affect and 
the opposite party (Iyengar and Westwood 2015), but also that these cognitive associations are 
frequently automatically and subconsciously activated when people are exposed to explicitly 
partisan stimuli (Burdein et al. 2006). The emergence of this affective response is often an 
uncontrollable and spontaneous reaction, which can then affect how people react towards the 
stimuli either without awareness of their attitudes or without awareness of what is causing their 
attitudes (Lodge and Taber 2013). Put simply, due to the strong associations between affect and 
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partisanship in long term memory, when people see or hear about someone’s partisanship they 
automatically experience a positive or negative emotional response, depending on whether the 
individual is a co-partisan or opposing partisans. Once this partisan affect is activated, people can 
engage in subconscious or conscious partisan prejudice.  
 I argue here that this spontaneous activation of polarized partisan affect could also occur 
when exposed to partisan cultural stereotypes, and as such automatically activate polarized partisan 
affect even when explicit partisan signals are not present. Exposure to these cultural attributes, 
because they are cognitively linked to partisanship, can cause the automatic and uncontrollable 
activation of other concepts cognitively linked to partisanship, namely polarized partisan affect. 
Thus, a Republican being introduced to someone who likes yoga and vegan restaurants might 
potentially experience an automatic, uncontrollable response of negative partisan affect in this 
initial meeting. Because yoga and vegan food primes Democrat which then primes negative affect, 
these partisan cultural stereotypes can elicit automatic reactions of polarized partisan affect even 
when partisanship is not mentioned. As such, exposure partisan cultural stereotypes should cause 
the spontaneous activation of polarized artisan affect.  
Whether or not these spontaneous group attitudes lead to more controlled and deliberative 
expressions of partisan prejudice depends on two things: an individual’s motivation to engage in 
a more effortful and conscious judgement and their opportunity to do so (Fazio 1990). The 
motivation to engage in more thorough cognitive processing could be the result of a variety of 
forces that may cause people “…to gauge the appropriateness, or even counter the influence, of an 
automatically-activated attitude” (Fazio and Olsen 2014). Whether this motivation is a desire to 
abide by social norms and control prejudices (Devine 1989; Dunton and Fazio 1997) or a concern 
about having a more accurate opinion (Schuette and Fazio 1995), if individuals have the motivation 
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to stop and think about their automatic reactions to stimuli deliberative expressions of prejudice 
might be different from these automatically activated attitudes. As such, people can, if they desire 
to, control their automatic partisan prejudice.  
Regarding partisanship, however, there might not be a motivation to “override” these 
automatic reactions. When exposed to overt partisan labels, partisans have engaged in partisan bias 
in political outcomes (Druckman et al. 2013; Mason 2015; Nicholson 2012) as well as in apolitical 
outcomes (Bishop 2009; Huber and Malhotra 2017; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Nicholson et al. 
2016). This consistent and frequent expression of in-party favoritism and out-party derogation 
seems to be result of a lack of social norms against partisan bias (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). 
Partisan bias is theorized to be acceptable, even encouraged sometimes, which can minimize 
people’s motivation to control against their automatic reactions of partisan bias. As such, I then 
expect that exposure to partisan cultural stereotypes will not only lead people to the spontaneous 
activation of partisan bias but also to the deliberative expression of partisan bias.  
 To test these two different hypotheses, I conduct two separate studies. First, I look at the 
effect of partisan cultural stereotypes on the automatic activation of partisan bias using an implicit 
measure of partisan affect. Then, I look at how these partisan cultural stereotypes affect more 
deliberative expressions of partisan bias and prejudice using a social evaluation experiment.  
 
Partisan Cultural Stereotypes and Spontaneous Partisan Prejudice 
 
One way to assess the strength of the association between attitudes and groups is through 
the use of an Implicit Attitude Test (IAT). This task is designed to capture cognitive links between 
groups and an evaluative dimension as well as the ease at which facilitation occurs between the 
two concepts. By measuring the time it takes to categorize both the group and evaluation using 
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two response keys that have both been assigned dual meanings, this measure can measure both of 
these aspect of cognitive association (Greenwald et al. 1998). The faster the response time for a 
key assigned to one of the target groups and one of the evaluative dimensions indicates that this 
category/evaluation pairing is more strongly associated in the respondent’s long term memory. 
In the spring of 2017, I conducted a study among 175 undergraduates where participants 
were randomly assigned to complete one of three brief IATs (BIAT), which is a condensed version 
of the IAT. In this paper, I focus on the results from only two of the BIATs which paired partisan 
symbols with positive and negative words. One-third of the subjects took a BIAT where these 
affect words were paired with eight explicitly partisan stimuli, things like a picture of a donkey 
labeled “The Democratic Party” or the logo of the Republican National Committee. Another third 
of the subjects took a BIAT where these positive and negative words were paired with eight 
implicitly partisan cultural stereotype stimuli.16 The four Democratic cultural stereotypes used 
were hip-hop, foreign films, urban, and vegans, and the four Republican cultural stereotypes used 
were big business, country music, golf, and rural.17 In both BIATs, I used a standard set of positive 
(Wonderful, Best, Superb, and Excellent) and negative words (Terrible, Awful, Worst, and 
Horrible). The explicitly partisan BIAT acts as a baseline level of comparison for the association 
of partisan affect and partisan cultural stereotype stimuli. 
In each BIAT, participants completed six rounds of 20 timed categorizations. The first two 
rounds were treated as training in order for participants to become accommodated with the 
structure of the task. The last four rounds were used for scoring the strength of the association 
                                                 
16 These stimuli are in the Appendix B.  
17 The cultural attributes used in the cultural symbol IAT are traits that were rated as distinctly 
typical of only one of the two parties by undergraduates in a separate study conducted in the fall 
of 2015. 
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between partisan affect and the partisan stimuli. Within each round, participants were asked to 
categorize one partisan group’s stimuli and positive words by pressing the “i” key on the keyboard, 
and to categorize everything else by pressing the “e” key on the keyboard. Each respondent, 
completed two rounds where they categorized Democratic stimuli with positive words and two 
rounds where Republican stimuli were paired with positive words. The order of these four rounds 
was randomized, and within each round the order in which stimuli was presented was randomized.   
To calculate Implicit Partisan Affect, I subtracted the mean response times for the two 
rounds that paired co-partisan targets with positive terms from the mean response times for the 
two rounds that paired opposing partisan targets with positive terms.18 Positive values of this 
variable indicate a stronger cognitive association between positive words and co-partisans, and 
negative values indicate a stronger cognitive association between positive words and opposing 
partisans.  
Figure 1 plots the distribution and mean value of Implicit Partisan Affect for both the 
cultural symbol BIAT and the explicit partisan symbol BIAT among all partisans. The results from 
both BIAT measures demonstrate that values of Implicit Partisan Affect correspond closely with 
respondents’ party identification. The majority of partisans in the sample have positive values of 
Implicit Partisan Affect, suggesting that they have a stronger association between their own party 
and positive words than the other party and positive words. This occurs regardless of the type of 
BIAT the partisan completed.  The median of Implicit Partisan Affect for the explicit partisan 
symbols is 53.11 milliseconds (mean = 82.57, se = 26.44, N = 53), and the median of Implicit 
                                                 
18 To calculate the average mean value, I followed the process of Greenwald et al. 2003 except I 
did not calculate a D-Score and instead kept the BIAT results in terms of milliseconds.  
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Partisan Affect for the partisan cultural symbols BIAT is 74.78 milliseconds (mean = 91.77, se = 
21.06, N = 50).  
Furthermore, the distribution of Implicit Partisan Affect for respondents who completed 
the cultural symbols BIAT is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution of Implicit 
Partisan Affect for respondents who completed the explicit partisan BIAT. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distributions is insignificant with a p-value of 0.918. This similarity is 
further substantiated by the fact that the means of Implicit Partisan Affect across the two tasks are  
statistically indistinguishable from each other as well, with a difference in means of -9.20 
milliseconds (p = 0.73). While Implicit Partisan Affect for the cultural stereotype BIAT is slightly 
stronger, this difference is imprecisely estimated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Implicit Partisan Affect 
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Overall, the results from this study suggest two main findings. First, that these cultural 
stereotypes are cognitively linked to partisanship as well as the affective nodes that are themselves 
linked to partisanship. Respondents have a stronger cognitive association between in-party cultural 
symbols and positive affect than opposing party cultural symbols and positive affect, indicated by 
the positive mean of Implicit Partisan Affect. These cultural aspects of the party are cognitively 
“linked nodes” to both partisanship and partisan affect. Second, this association is statistically just 
as strong as the association between explicit partisan symbols and partisan affect. The almost 
complete overlap of Implicit Partisan Affect across the cultural symbol stimuli and partisan symbol 
stimuli suggests that these partisan cultural stereotypes are as cognitively associated with partisan 
affect and partisanship as explicit partisan symbols. Thus, exposure to someone saying they play 
golf or practice yoga can potentially activate as much partisan affect as exposure to someone 
saying they are a Democrat or a Republican. As such, exposure to these partisan cultural 
stereotypes on an everyday basis can potentially lead to deliberate expressions of favoritism and 
admiration towards people whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of the in-party and 
deliberate expressions of animosity towards people who prefer cultural and lifestyle choices of the 
opposite party. If so, then there might be evidence for a lack of motivation to control these 
automatic expressions of polarized partisan affect.   
 
Partisan Cultural Stereotypes and Deliberative Partisan Prejudice 
 
To test the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes on deliberative social evaluations, I 
conducted a laboratory experiment in the fall of 2016. 334 undergraduate students participated in 
this omnibus study. Participants were first asked a series of questions about their demographics, 
political attitudes, and consumer behavior, then they completed the social evaluation experiment.  
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In the social evaluation experiment portion of the study, all participants were asked to 
evaluate three different hypothetical individuals: a candidate in a hypothetical non-partisan county 
level election, a fellow intern at a hypothetical internship, and a hypothetical local doctor 
recommended to them by a friend.19 Within each context, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three potential biography types: a “Democrat” individual, a “Republican” individual, or a 
control individual. All nine of these treatment biographies included only apolitical information 
about the hypothetical individual, and did not mention any explicitly political information either 
through partisan labels or policy positions.20 In addition, all three of the biography types featured 
different information across the three treatment contexts so that individuals who randomly 
received all three of the same type of biography, i.e. three “Democrat” biographies, did not receive 
the same biography three times. The specific wording for each of the nine biographies is in 
Appendix B.  
 
Partisan Categorization  
After receiving each of the biographies, participants were immediately asked to evaluate 
the hypothetical individual on several dimensions, which varied by context. After respondents 
answered the pertinent social evaluation questions, participants were then asked to rate the partisan 
typicality of the candidate, doctor, and intern on a seven-point scale that ranged from Very Typical 
                                                 
19 All participants received the candidate biography first. Then half of the participants received the 
doctor biography first and the intern biography second, and the other half received the intern 
biography first and the doctor biography second.  
20 The information includes: the first name of the individual (except for in the candidate treatment), 
their hometown, and three sets of hobbies and activities. The cultural attributes used in the partisan 
treatments are traits that were rated as distinctly typical of only one of the two parties by 
undergraduates in a separate study conducted in the fall of 2015.  
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Democrat to Very Typical Republican. From these questions, I created Perceived Partisanship 
and rescaled the variable to range from -1 (Very Typical Democrat) to 1 (Very Typical 
Republican). To assess whether partisan categorization of these candidates, doctors, and interns 
did indeed occur from exposure to partisan cultural stereotypes, I then conducted a difference in 
means test across all three biographies in each context.  
Figures 2a-2c show the mean levels of Perceived Partisanship for the candidate context, 
the doctor context, and the intern context, respectively. Within each context, participants 
categorized the “Republican” and “Democratic” treatments “correctly.” All three of the 
“Republicans” are seen as highly typical of the Republican Party (Mcandidate = 0.65; Mdoctor= 0.56; 
Mintern= 0.47), and all three “Democrats” are seen as highly typical of the Democratic Party 
(Mcandidate = -0.56; Mdoctor= -0.60; Mintern= -0.48). In addition, within each context each of the three 
different biographies are seen as conceptually and significantly different in terms of their partisan 
typicality. The “Republican” treatment and the “Democratic” treatment are perceived to be the 
treatment most typical of the Republican and Democratic Party, respectively, in each of the three 
contexts. Overall, the results from this difference in means test suggest that a target individual’s 
cultural preferences can and do trigger partisan categorization regardless of the context in which 
this exposure occurs. As such, I next examine whether these partisan cultural stereotypes lead to 
expressions of intergroup bias in all three of these contexts across a broad range of social 
evaluations.  
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Figure 2a: Mean Partisan Categorization of Candidate Treatments +/- 1 Standard Deviation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Mean Partisan Categorization of Doctor Treatments +/- 1 Standard Deviation 
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Figure 2c: Mean Partisan Categorization of Intern Treatments +/- 1 Standard Deviation 
 
 
Partisan Social Evaluations  
Since I am not only interested in testing whether these partisan cultural stereotypes affect 
social evaluations, but also in assessing the scope of partisan prejudice, respondents were asked to 
judge each of the three different individuals on different types of evaluations.   
After receiving the candidate biography, participants were asked about their likelihood of 
voting for this candidate to capture the extent to which people used these partisan cultural 
stereotypes as cues for vote choice in a non-partisan election. After receiving the doctor biography, 
participants were asked to evaluate the doctor on two dimensions. They were first asked about 
their likelihood of visiting him if they were sick, which was followed by a question about how 
comfortable they would feel talking to the doctor about all potential medical conditions and 
treatments. Both of these questions aimed to measure whether partisan stereotyping plays a role in 
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everyday decisions about service selection as well as indirect measures of how likely people are 
to trust and feel comfortable with a co-partisan versus an opposing partisan in charge of their 
health. 
Lastly, after receiving the intern biography, participants were also asked to evaluate the 
intern on two dimensions. First, participants were asked about their likelihood of recommending 
the fellow intern for a promotion. This question was selected in order to assess the extent to which 
partisan stereotypes affect rewarding someone in a situation when the outcome does not directly 
affect the respondent or the status of the respondent’s political party. Despite this lack of a direct 
implication, however, group success is uniquely tied to group members’ self-esteem, and some 
group members might look to bolster the standing of their group and fellow group members to 
produce positive self-esteem (Ellemers et al. 2002). Following this promotion question, 
participants were then asked a battery of social distance questions. These four questions were used 
to capture the level of desired interaction a participant would want to have with a hypothetical 
intern, and how partisan stereotyping from apolitical attributes can play a role in whom participants 
decide to spend their time with (Bogardus 1933). 
In general, I hypothesize that participants will be more likely to positively evaluate 
members of their own party as well as negatively evaluate members of the opposing party. As 
such, I recode the treatment variables into In-Party Treatment and Out-Party Treatment to more 
appropriately capture the effect of the in-group versus the out-group. In-Party Treatment is coded 
as 1 if a respondent received a treatment stereotypical of their own party and 0 otherwise. Out-
Party Treatment is coded 1 if the respondent received a treatment stereotypical of the opposing 
party, 0 otherwise. Since I am interested in partisan group effects, I exclude only pure independents 
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from this analysis because they do not have a clear out-party. Table 1 shows the results from 
regressing the treatment dummy variables on each of the five social evaluations. 
Table 1.  The Effect of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes on Social Evaluations 
 
 Vote 
Choice 
Doctor 
Visit 
Doctor 
Comfort 
Intern 
Recommend 
Intern Social 
Proximity 
“In-Party”  0.07*** -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 
Treatment (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
“Out-Party”  -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 
Treatment (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Republicans 0.09*** -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Female -0.04 0.01 -0.05** -0.01 0.00 
               (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Non-White -0.04 -0.10*** -0.07** -0.07** -0.06*** 
               (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Intercept 0.44*** 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.73*** 0.71*** 
               (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.11 
N  334 334 334 334 334 
All Dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate more positive social 
evaluation. OLS coefficients with standard errors below. 
p<.15; *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
First and foremost, across every context and form of social evaluation respondents who 
received an Out-Party Treatment are significantly less likely to positively and favorably evaluate 
this individual, whomever it is. Respondents are less likely to vote for a candidate whose cultural 
preferences are stereotypical of the opposite party by -0.13 (p < 0.00) compared to the control 
candidate. They are less likely to visit (= -0.19, p <0.00) and feel comfortable talking to a doctor 
(= -0.11, p < 0.00) whose cultural preferences suggest that he politically disagrees with the 
respondent. And again, in the intern context, respondents are significantly less likely to 
recommend, as well as want to hang out with, a fellow intern who could be a member of the 
opposite party by -0.14 (p < 0.00) and -0.13 (p < 0.00), respectively, compared to the control. In 
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each aspect of evaluation, respondents express a significant and substantively large negative 
evaluation of people whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of their out party.   
In comparison, receiving an in-party treatment only significantly affects respondents’ 
likelihood of vote choice in the non-partisan election scenario. Respondents who received a 
treatment describing a candidate whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of the respondent’s 
party are significantly more likely to vote for this candidate by 0.07 (p <0.00) compared to the 
control candidate. Thus, it seems that the only context in which respondents not only do not prefer 
a member of the opposite party but also actively prefer a member of their own party is the most 
political environment.  
Overall, these results suggest that respondents primarily want to consistently avoid or 
express dislike towards members of the opposite party, and only prefer a member of the in-party 
when it comes to explicit contexts of governance. As such, interacting with a “non-partisan” or 
control is seen as just as fine as interacting with a co-partisan.  
 
But is it Partisan Categorization? 
 
To test whether the effects of these treatments operate through the theorized mechanism of 
partisan categorization of partisan cultural stereotypes, I use this section to conduct a mediation 
analysis with Perceived In-Party as the mediating variable. Perceived In-Party is a recoded version 
of Perceived Partisanship, which ranges from -1 to 1 with higher values of Perceived In-Party 
indicating that the respondent perceived the treatment as being typical of the respondents’ in-party 
and negative values indicating that the respondent perceived the treatment as being typical of their 
out-party.  
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For each of the six significant direct treatment effects, I conduct a test of mediation using 
a Sobel-Goodman test.21 However, since I have five different dependent variables and six tests of 
mediation, I just present the Sobel test statistics and percentage of the total effect mediated for 
each test of mediation in Table 2. If the Sobel test statistic is significant then all four conditions of 
proper mediation are met. First, the treatment variable, here In-Party Treatment or Out-Party 
Treatment, significantly affects the outcome variable, any of the social evaluation dependent 
variables. Second, the treatment variable significantly affects the mediator variable, Perceived In-
Party. Third, the mediator variable, Perceived In-Party, significantly affects the outcome variable, 
any of the social evaluation variables, when controlling for the effect of the treatment. And lastly, 
the size of the treatment effect is smaller when controlling for the mediator compared to the size 
of the treatment effect when not controlling for the mediator variable (Baron and Kenny 1986; 
Judd and Kenny 1981).  
Table 2 shows the results of this mediation analysis among all participants for each of the 
six direct treatment effects in Table 2. Column 1 describes the test of mediation being conducted, 
with the treatment variable listed first, followed by the mediator, and then the outcome variable. 
In every test of mediation, the Sobel test is statistically significant, seen in Column 2, which 
suggests that in every case where a treatment significantly affects respondents’ social evaluations, 
this effect is mediated by partisan categorization from only apolitical information. People are 
exposed to partisan cultural stereotypes. They categorize these individuals by partisanship. They 
then use this partisan categorization to make evaluations of the individual.  
                                                 
21 I also conducted a causal steps approach (Baron and Kenny 1986) for each of these six tests for 
mediation. They confirm the results of the Sobel test, and are in the appendix.  
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Not only does Perceived In-Party significantly mediate the relationship between the 
treatment and the outcome variable, it mediates a substantial portion of the relationship between 
the treatment and the outcome variable in every instance. The results from the Sobel tests suggest 
that in every test for mediation, Perceived In-Party mediates more than 50% of the total effect of 
the treatment when not controlling for the mediator. As a result, the evidence from these tests of 
mediation suggest that people do in fact engage in partisan categorization when learning about an 
individual’s cultural proclivities, hobbies, and everyday likes and dislikes. This process of partisan 
categorization then leads to deliberate and controlled expressions of partisan bias and prejudice, 
mainly of people who are categorized into the out-party, in a variety of contexts and types of 
evaluations.  
Table 2: The Mediating Effects of Perceived In-Party 
 
Mediation Model 
Sobel Test 
Statistic 
Percentage of 
Total Effect 
Mediated 
In-Party → Perceived In-Party → Vote Choice 
Z = 4.375 
(p < 0.00) 
165% 
Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Vote Choice 
Z= -4.201 
(p < 0.00) 
64% 
Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Doctor Visit 
Z= -5.198 
(p < 0.00) 
70% 
Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Doctor Comfort 
Z= -4.329 
(p < 0.00) 
92% 
Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Intern Recommend 
Z= -4.794 
(p < 0.00) 
80% 
Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Social Proximity 
Z= -6.332 
(p < 0.00) 
92% 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I demonstrate that through its cognitive and affective associations in long 
term memory, partisanship may have a broader impact than previously thought. People associate 
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seemingly mundane, everyday information with the partisan stereotypes. Because of this cognitive 
association with partisanship, these partisan cultural stereotypes elicit automatic partisan affect as 
well as shape the way people make deliberative decisions in social situations.  
First, my results suggest that people clearly associate these cultural attributes with the two 
political parties. Exposure to these cultural attributes facilitates the automatic and subconscious 
activation of partisan affect at nearly similar levels as exposure to partisan labels. Not only do 
these results suggest that these cultural symbols are just as cognitively hard wired into people’s 
conceptualization of partisan categories, but also that mere exposure to these cultural stereotype 
attributes can lead to the automatic and uncontrollable activation of polarized partisan affect. Thus, 
explicitly partisan symbols do not need to be present for individuals to subconsciously feel and 
react as if they had been exposed to partisan stimuli.  
Furthermore, these cultural stereotypes can also influence more deliberative expressions of 
partisan bias, specifically regarding social evaluations in both a non-partisan political context and 
apolitical contexts. Across a variety of different social contexts and types of evaluations, partisans 
express partisan bias and seem to be unmotivated to control their automatic activation of polarized 
partisan affect regarding negativity towards the opposite party and, in one case, positivity towards 
co-partisans.  
Partisans consistently express a dislike of candidates, interns, and doctors whose cultural 
preferences are stereotypical of the opposing party. Not only are partisans less likely to vote for a 
perceived out-partisan, they also express negative evaluations of stereotypical opposing partisans 
in apolitical scenarios. In both social evaluations of the doctor, partisan respondents are 
significantly less likely to visit and feel comfortable around a doctor whose partisan cultural 
stereotypes are suggestive of the opposing party. Despite the fact that the doctor was highly 
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qualified, with decades of experience, and recommended by a friend, all of which are considered 
to be more important aspects than personal characteristics when selecting a doctor (Bornstein et 
al. 2000; Wolinsky and Steiber 1982), partisans still decline to use a doctor whose personal 
characteristics suggest that they are politically different.  
Similarly, in both social evaluations of the fellow intern, partisans who read that a fellow 
intern held preferences stereotypical of the opposing party are significantly less likely to 
recommend this intern for a job promotion and less willing to interact with them outside of the 
work environment. Without any other information besides cultural preferences, respondents here 
are significantly more likely to punish an intern perceived to be a member of the opposite party 
even though this outcome has little to no impact on the respondent or the respondent’s party. And 
when faced with the potential of interacting with this individual, respondents are less willing and 
happy to form a personal relationship with someone perceived to be a member of the opposite 
party.  
Looking at their evaluations of co-partisans, only partisans’ vote choice significantly 
increased when evaluating someone stereotypical of their party. Unsurprisingly, it seems that 
partisans gain additional peace of mind by selecting someone from their own party compared to a 
more politically ambiguous candidate. Partisans can trust someone from their own party to act in 
their own political interests compared to a neutral individual. Surprisingly, though, these results 
conflict with the results from some of my previous work which finds an insignificant effect of In-
Party Treatment on Vote Choice. One reason for a significant finding in this paper could be the 
timing of the study. The study in this paper was conducted during the 2016 presidential primary 
races, whereas the study in the other paper was conducted in the Spring of 2015. Partisan identity 
and partisan voting may have been more salient in the study conducted in this paper due to the 
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environmental context at the time. As a result, partisan voting for an in-party candidate may have 
been a greater concern for the respondents in this survey.  
Finally, using several mediation analyses to isolate the effect of Perceived In-Partisanship, 
I find that the effect of these partisan cultural stereotype biographies on various different forms of 
social evaluation partially operates through the mechanism of partisan categorization. This 
significant mediation occurs in every case where these cultural biographies significantly shape 
how respondents evaluate these three types of hypothetical individuals. These results suggest that 
one of the primary mechanisms through which people evaluate other’s cultural preferences is 
partisan identity, and, more generally, through a political lens. This in turn affects how they feel 
about complete strangers in a variety of social situations and types of evaluations.  
Overall, the results from these two studies suggest that exposure to these partisan cultural 
stereotypes can affect automatic, uncontrollable polarized partisan affect as well as more conscious 
expressions of partisan bias. Both studies demonstrate that partisan cultural stereotypes are potent 
pieces of political information and exposure to these seemingly apolitical lifestyle choices can 
shape conscious and potentially subconscious expressions of attitudes and behavior towards 
others. In particular, the results from study 1, that partisan cultural stereotypes can elicit 
spontaneous partisan affect, suggest that subtler forms of partisan bias can occur as a result of 
exposure to seemingly mundane lifestyle choices. Evidence that subliminal group primes affect 
people’s behavior without their awareness (Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996) suggests that partisan 
cultural stereotype primes could potentially cause individuals to engage in expressions of partisan 
bias without them being aware of their actions and/or the processes influencing their actions. 
People might be expressing favoritism for in-partisans and/or animosity towards out-partisans on 
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a daily basis through more unintentional actions – avoiding eye contact, unconscious imitation, 
and particular facial gestures.   
Concerning these more controllable and aware decisions to express partisan prejudice, 
respondents seem particularly inclined to negatively evaluate members of the opposite party rather 
than favor members of their own party. In general, these results point to the relative motivational 
power of negative information compared to positive information (Baumeister et al. 2001), as 
respondents are more likely to significantly alter their social evaluations when the partisan cultural 
stereotypes facilitate the activation of negative affect. Thinking specifically about partisanship, 
these results both provide further evidence for the relative strength of out-party effects when 
compared to in-party effects demonstrated in the previous literature on partisan group dynamics 
(Nicholson 2012), as well as highlight the strength of out-party animosity as a source of motivation 
in the current American political environment (Bump 2016; Iyengar et al. 2012). 
As social groups become politicized and connected with the two partisan coalitions, these 
associated cultural symbols transform into key signals of partisanship. As a result, political 
preferences are now easily discernible, and in some cases immediately visible, when you see 
someone. For instance, if someone on the street is wearing tie dye and Birkenstocks most people 
will probably categorize that individual as a Democrat without even interacting with them. From 
this categorization, one can then decide whether they want to even interact with that individual at 
all. In other words, people could potentially be subconsciously aware of other’s partisanship 
through just observing them and learning about their basic everyday activities. This constant 
subconscious awareness of partisanship can lead to partisan categorization and discrimination from 
an even earlier point of interaction.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
LOOKS LIKE A DEMOCRAT: PARTISAN VISUAL CATEGORIZATION AND ITS 
EFFECT ON IMPRESSION FORMATION AND DAILY INTERACTIONS 
 
ABSTRACT: The past decade powerfully reminds us that partisan identity is a pivotal social identity 
that people use to navigate political and apolitical environments. In this paper, I argue that partisan 
identity and a range of social identities are now so intertwined that people associate visual markers 
of cultural preferences, such as wearing flannel or camouflage for example, with the two parties. 
As a result, people can form partisan impressions of others without them even uttering a word, 
much less sharing an issue position. In an original study, I show that, first, respondents do indeed 
engage in spontaneous partisan categorization upon simply seeing people. Second, I show that this 
partisan categorization, along with social group categorization, affects respondents’ initial 
impressions, evaluations of, and willingness to interact with these individuals. Overall, these 
results suggest that partisan identity is a visually observable identity and that people use these 
visual partisan stereotypes to guide social evaluations with others by their physical appearance 
before even getting to know them.   
 
Partisans discriminate based off others’ partisan identity in a variety of different 
hypothetical or real contexts largely in part because partisan discrimination is not only socially 
accepted but often encouraged (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). It is perhaps fortunate, then, that 
partisan identity (and associated issue positions) is not easily attainable information in most 
contexts. Most people tend to avoid political discussion on a daily basis (Mutz 2006), and few 
people wear a name tag that says “Democrat” or “Republican.” 
However, not knowing someone’s partisan identity does not restrict someone’s ability to 
categorize and stereotype individuals by party. Through increased sorting between social groups 
and the two political parties (Mason 2016), the cultural symbols used to impute social group 
membership can now be used to impute partisan membership, provided the social group is uniquely 
associated with only one party. As such, some everyday cultural preferences, like driving a pickup 
or wearing camouflage, are partisan cultural stereotypes. Since these everyday cultural 
preferences are typically basic information about individuals’ hobbies and preferences, they are 
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relatively available pieces of information about people and can even be observed through visible 
stimuli, such as clothing choice, hair style, or the stuff people own and carry with them. Since 
people have an innate, automatic tendency to categorize individuals into groups simply when 
observing someone, mere exposure to someone’s physical appearance may lead to the partisan 
categorization and partisan discrimination of complete strangers.  
In this paper, I work to broaden the discussion of partyism by assessing the extent to which 
people spontaneously engage in partisan categorization and express partisan bias towards others 
simply from observing their physical appearance. I test this first by showing that people engage in 
partisan categorization when briefly exposed to pictures of an individual wearing visual partisan 
cultural stereotypes. For example, a picture of a white male with long hair, a scraggly beard, in a 
tie-dye shirt, and wearing sandals is systematically categorized as a Democrat while a photograph 
of the same man wearing a NASCAR shirt and a camouflage American flag hat is considered a 
Republican. I build on these initial results by assessing whether respondents perceive these 
individuals as friendly and competent and find that perceived partisan identity, along with 
perceived social group identity, affects partisans’ ratings of friendliness and competence.  
In a second study, I use the pictures from Study 1 to show that people express partisan bias 
in certain types of social evaluations simply by looking at someone. When it comes to assessing 
whether these stereotypical “partisans” care about, respect, and understand people like them, both 
Republicans and Democrats believe that stereotypical opposing partisans do not care, respect, or 
understand people like them. These feelings of partisan bias do not necessarily translate to 
expressions of behavioral social evaluations. Democrats and Republicans engage in behavioral 
expressions of partisan bias when asked to evaluate explicit partisans, but this bias is limited when 
it comes to evaluating stereotypical partisans in both long-term, obligatory social situations and 
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short-term, voluntary situations.  
Overall, the results from these studies suggest that people categorize, stereotype, and 
formulate some biased social evaluations of others as partisans depending on what clothes they are 
wearing and how they are styled. As a result, partisan identity can be a visually observable identity 
that people can automatically categorize others by and that these automatic categorizations can 
have lasting effects on person perception and social evaluations.  
 
Partisan Stereotypes and Visual Categorization 
 
Partisan identity has recently emerged as a salient and influential group identity in 
apolitical environments (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Iyengar et al. 2018). The two parties are 
perceived to be comprised of different types of people and social groups (Ahler and Sood 2018; 
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991) and partisans, now, 
perceive opposing partisans as extreme and increasingly dissimilar (Ahler 2014; Hetherington, 
Long, and Rudolph 2016). As a result, partisanship is a critical societal cleavage that is a clear 
division within political and social life. Partisans express positive attitudes towards co-partisans 
and negative attitudes toward opposing partisans. This partisan bias has affected both interparty 
attitudes (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) as well as interparty behavior in both online surveys 
and the real world (Huber and Malhotra 2017; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Levendusky 2018; 
McConnell et al. 2018). In none of these studies is the context directly relevant to political 
outcomes or expressly political, yet, partisans use partisan identity to formulate decisions on how 
to feel toward and interact with individuals. In order to be able to discriminate along partisan lines, 
however, people need to be able to categorize individuals as a member of a political party.   
Vision and visual information are central to the process of group categorization and person 
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perception. Indeed, within milliseconds of viewing someone, humans can detect whether that 
person is male or female, young or old, Latino or black (Thorpe, Fize, and Marlot 1996). A 
person’s visual attributes - their face, hair style, and clothing choices, for instance – are central to 
this process of visual group categorization (Macrae et al. 2005; Quinn, Mason, and Macrae 2009; 
Rentfrow and Gosling 2006). Through these aspects of intentional visual and physical appearance, 
people unwittingly communicate a plethora of information about themselves, which enables 
observers to categorize complete strangers into groups immediately upon seeing them (Quinn, 
Mason, and Macrae 2009). For instance, if an individual has long hair they are more likely to be 
categorized as a female and assigned stereotypical feminine traits (Manning 2010). From this 
spontaneous group categorization, people can begin to decode who this individual is, what values 
she holds, and how she would act in a given situation (Hall 2009; Uleman and Saribay 2012).  
While partisan identity is not typically thought of as a visible identity, through the well-
known relationship between parties and the social groups that “belong” to each party (Green, 
Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991), people can use the visible 
cultural symbols of social groups to impute partisan identity. Cultural symbols, like a national flag 
or a cross necklace, have long been used by group members to provide a statement about their 
beliefs as well as signal to the outside world that they are members of these groups and distinct 
from people in other groups (Firth 1973; Geisler 2005). For example, wearing a suit and a nice 
watch might suggest that someone is affluent, while wearing a cowboy hat might suggest that 
someone is from a rural area and a farmer. From these visible social group attributes, people can 
easily and automatically categorize strangers and non-acquaintances as members of a specific 
social group. If that social group is cognitively associated with a specific party, then these aspects 
of physical appearance can lead people to categorize these individuals as partisans as well. A man 
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wearing a suit and a nice watch might not only lead someone to see him as affluent but also as a 
Republican. Through the cognitive association between social groups and party, these visible 
social group cultural symbols become cognitively linked to partisan identity and transform into 
aspects of the partisan stereotype. As such, I hypothesize that upon viewing someone, and 
observing their visual partisan cultural stereotypes, people can spontaneously categorize someone 
as a member of a political party. 
Through partisan categorization, these visual stimuli may have broad effects on the initial 
impressions formed of others which in turn can affect social evaluations of them. Thus, partisan 
categorization is not the only outcome of the visual manifestations of partisan cultural stereotypes. 
There are also “downstream” implications of categorization. In this paper, I look at two different 
types of attitudinal outcomes that may result from categorization: impression formation and social 
evaluation.  
 
Impression Formation  
When forming impressions of others, people are primarily interested in deciphering an 
individual’s warmth and competence (Uleman and Kressel 2013). Warmth typically accounts for 
the perceived intentions of an individual and whether these intentions are positive or negative. 
Perceptions of competence are a reflection of whether an individual is seen as capable of carrying 
out this intent (Fiske 1992; Fiske et al. 2002). Impressions of others along these “separate 
dimensions of (dis)like and (dis)respect” are largely reflections of an individual’s group 
membership (Fiske et al. 2002, pg. 879).  
An individual is seen as warm (cold), if their group is viewed as not competitive and not 
in conflict with (competitive and in conflict) with the perceiver’s in-group. Since intergroup 
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relations play a large role in directing the perception of an individual’s warmth, I expect that this  
dimension of impression formation will be largely affected by the perception of an individual’s 
partisanship. The effect of a respondent’s partisan identity on perceived warmth is bolstered by 
both the close cognitive association between partisan identity and affect (Iyengar and Westwood 
2012; Taber and Lodge 2013) and the unique environment of direct and overt political competition 
in which the two groups exist.  
An individual is perceived as competent (incompetent) if their group is considered to be a 
group of high (low) status in the social hierarchy (Fiske et al. 2002; Uleman and Kressel 2013). 
Since the partisan coalitions incorporate groups from all aspects of social life, with economic, 
racial, and religious differences, I do not think that perceptions of competence will be as highly 
correlated with perceived partisan identity. Republicans can be white, male, religious, rural, or 
affluent. Democrats, on the other hand, can be ethnically diverse, female, morally progressive, 
urban, or poor (Hunter 1991). While all these different types social groups can be categorized and 
stereotyped as either Republicans or Democrats (Ahler and Sood 2018; Miller, Wlezien, and 
Hildreth 1991), the social status of these distinct social groups within the two party coalitions vary 
widely. Two social groups that are considered to be part of the Republican partisan coalition are 
the elderly and the rich (Fiske et al. 2002). These two groups, however, are stereotypically 
perceived as low social status and high relative social status, respectively. This divergence in social 
status exists among different social groups in the Democrat partisan coalition as well. Highly 
educated individuals are thought to have higher social status than those who are working class or 
low income (Fiske et al. 2002). Therefore, I expect that regardless of whether an individual is 
categorized as a partisan, their perceived social group can lead to differentiations in initial 
impressions of competence.  
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 Beyond the effect of visual partisan cultural stereotypes on impression formation, it is also 
possible that this automatic partisan categorization can affect social evaluations and treatment of 
strangers. Once categorization of an individual occurs, the resulting group-based impression of the 
individual is thought to be stable and enduring (Fiske 1998). Thus, once an individual 
automatically categorizes a stranger as a partisan, that individual is evaluated as a member of that 
particular political group. Recent work on affective polarization has established that when people 
know the partisan identity of others, partisans tend to favor co-partisans and express animosity 
towards members of the opposite party, even sometimes encouraging outright discrimination 
(Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Nicholson et al. 2016). Furthermore, partisans 
also express a desire for increased (or decreased) physical and social distance from a known 
member of the out-party (or in-party) (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Deichert, Goggin, and 
Theodoridis 2018). As a result, if simply seeing an individual dressed in stereotypical partisan 
clothing affects how that individual is categorized, then particular clothing styles or physical 
appearance could lead to expressions of partisan bias towards a complete stranger in a variety of 
different social evaluations and social scenarios. Thus, before even getting to know an individual 
or talking to them, people might start to engage in partisan bias by applying stereotypical partisan 
attitudes to them, negatively (or positively) evaluating them, and interacting with less (or more) 
due to perceptions of partisan identity.  
 
Partisan Visual Categorization and Impression Formation 
 
To test whether people systematically categorize others by partisan identity automatically upon 
seeing them, I designed a survey where individuals were asked to complete three speeded 
categorization tasks. In each task, respondents were asked to categorize twelve photos of an 
  
72 
 
individual on each of three attributes: partisan identity, friendliness, and competence. The study 
was conducted in January 2018 through the web-based survey and crowdsourcing platform, 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 370 U.S. citizens over the age of 18 participated in exchange 
for $1.00 payment. 206 respondents identified as Democrats, 103 respondents identified as 
Republican, and 61 respondents identified as pure Independents. The study took around 7 minutes.  
The study was described as a survey about political opinions and behaviors. Respondents 
answered a few demographic questions, completed all three of the speeded categorization tasks, 
and then completed two other unrelated tasks. Respondents categorized all twelve photographs by 
partisan identity, competence, and friendliness one attribute at a time. The order of the three sets 
was randomized and the order of the pictures within each set was also randomized.22 The twelve 
photographs featured the same individual, a thirty-year-old white male in eleven different visual 
manifestations of partisan cultural stereotypes and a neutral control. Five of the photos were ex-
ante posited to be typical of Democrats, five of the photos were ex-ante posited to be typical of 
Republicans, one photo (of the individual dressed as a Union member) was not posited to be ex-
ante Republican or Democrat, and one photo did not include any partisan cultural stereotypes and 
was included as the control.23  
The partisan cultural stereotypes exhibited in each of the photographs are visible characteristics 
of social groups associated with the two partisan coalitions and feature social groups of varying 
status and competitiveness within the social hierarchy. For instance, one picture features the model 
wearing a plaid shirt over an indie rock t-shirt and holding a vintage bike. These symbols are 
                                                 
22 The question wording for all three of the speeded categorization tasks is in the Appendix.  
23 The photo that is ex-ante posited to be neither Republican or Democrat is a man dressed up as a 
union member. Given the current shift in the voting behavior of this group, I had no expectations 
as how individuals would categorize him by partisan identity.  
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commonly associated with the creative class, a social group that is associated with the Democratic 
Party (Florida 2012; Infante 2015). Another photograph, features an individual wearing a cowboy 
hat and boots, two cultural symbols associated with rural people, a distinct part of the Republican 
Party’s coalition. All visual manifestations of these partisan cultural stereotypes were validated as 
uniquely belonging to one of the two parties in previous studies in which respondents were asked 
to categorize written stimuli or biographies of individuals by party.  
In addition to using pictures of the model dressed in various partisan cultural stereotypes, two 
of the photographs featured the model dressed in explicit partisan wear. In one picture the model 
is wearing a Clinton campaign shirt and in another the model is wearing a Trump campaign shirt. 
These explicit partisan visuals are included to provide a baseline comparison of the strength of 
partisan categorization given exposure to an individual exhibiting more implicit signals of partisan 
identity.24   
Respondents were only given 3 seconds to look at and categorize each photograph by the 
attribute.25 Restricting the time allotted only provides respondents with a thin-slice of information 
about the individual, mirroring the sensation of initial exposure to a stranger (Ambady and 
Rosenthal 1992; Tskhay et al. 2017). In addition, when a time constraint is imposed on direct 
measures of attitudes, the attitudes formed are more automatic attitudes than controlled attitudes 
(Ranganath, Smith, and Nosek 2008). It is only enough time for a respondent to formulate a gut 
reaction about this individual rather than an impression formed from deliberation. As such, these 
speeded categorization task should capture what type of impression automatically forms when 
given thin slices of information about an individual.  
                                                 
24 Pictures of all 12 of the treatments are in the Appendix.  
25 This information was provided to them in the task introduction.  
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Perceived Partisanship 
I first test whether respondents engage in partisan categorization when exposed to an 
individual’s physical appearance. Figure 1 shows the mean level of Perceived Partisanship, with 
95% confidence intervals around the mean, for each of the 12 treatments across the entire study 
sample.26 Perceived Partisanship is coded 0 for Republican categorization and 1 for Democrat 
categorization and the treatments, coded as dummy variables, are ordered from most Republican 
to most Democrat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average Perceived Partisanship of Picture Treatments with 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
                                                 
26 The mean values of Perceived Partisanship for each photograph are in the Appendix.  
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From Figure 1, two things are of note. First, the majority of “Republican” partisan cultural 
stereotype treatments are considered significantly more Republican than the control and the 
majority of “Democrat” partisan cultural stereotype treatments are considered to be significantly 
more Democrat than the control. For example, 84% of respondents view Camo, the model wearing 
a camouflage outer shirt, a NASCAR shirt, and a camouflage American flag hat, as Republican. 
87% of respondents perceive Hipster, the model wearing a plaid shirt over an indie rock t-shirt and 
holding a vintage bike, as a Democrat. The only two treatments perceived as indistinguishable 
from the control are Preppy, a treatment ex-ante believed to be a Republican treatment (MPrep= 
.61; MControl = .62; diff = -.01, p = 1.00) and Basketball, which was ex-ante stereotypical of the 
Democratic party (MBasketball = .67; MControl = .62; diff = .06, p = 1.00). The majority of respondents 
(67%), however, categorized Basketball “correctly”, it is simply that Control was also perceived 
by a majority of respondents (62%) as a Democrat. Preppy was the only treatment where the 
majority of respondents categorized the model “incorrectly” according to ex-ante expectations, as 
61% of the sample perceived him as a Democrat.  
Second, some partisan cultural stereotype treatments were perceived to be just as partisan as 
the explicit partisan treatments, Trump Supporter and Hillary Supporter. A difference in means 
test of Perceived Partisanship between Trump Supporter and Cowboy suggests that Perceived 
Partisanship is statistically indistinguishable between these two treatments (MTrump = .08; MCowboy 
= .13; diff = .05, p = 1.00). Perceived Partisanship is also indistinguishable between the two 
treatments Trump Supporter and Camo (MTrump = .08; MCamo = .16; diff = .08, p = .48). Similarly, 
the difference in means between Hillary Supporter and Hippie (MHillary = .92; MHippie = .87; diff = 
-.04, p = 1.00) is statistically insignificant as is the difference in means between Hillary Supporter 
and Hipster (MHillary = .92; MHipster = .87; diff = -.05, p = 1.00). Thus, when respondents see the 
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model wearing some cultural symbols of partisan coalition groups they are, on average, just as 
likely to elicit the same level of spontaneous partisan categorization as when the model is wearing 
explicit partisan clothing. People are just as likely to spontaneously think “Democrat” when they 
see an individual in tie-dye as when they see an individual in a Clinton t-shirt.  
Lastly, I included Union as a treatment to test whether a union worker (or working class 
individual, more generally) was thought of as Democrat or Republican. Due to the recent swing in 
working class voters, particularly in union heavy rust belt states, from Democrat to Republican in 
the 2016 presidential election, I had no theoretical expectations for how this individual would be 
categorized (Coontz 2016). The individual is wearing a union jacket, union hat, and carrying a 
union lunch bag (see the picture of the treatment in Appendix C). As Figure 1 shows Union is 
categorized as a highly typical Republican with a mean partisan categorization of 0.23. This could 
either be the result of actual partisan perception of Union switching from Democrat to Republican, 
or an effect of people not being able to recognize that this individual is wearing union related 
clothing.  
 To test whether partisan categorization is affected by respondent partisan identity, Figure 
2 shows the mean levels of Perceived Partisanship, with 95% confidence intervals around the 
mean, for each treatment among Democrats and Republicans separately. The Figure suggests that 
the mean values of Perceived Partisanship for each of the eleven treatment photographs are 
essentially the same across Democrats and Republicans. However, Democrats and Republicans 
perceive the control’s partisanship as statistically and substantively quite different.27 Democrats 
perceive the control to be more typical of the Democrat Party (MControl = .71) compared to 
                                                 
27 Difference in means results for each of the treatments by respondent party are in the Appendix. 
  
77 
 
Republicans, who perceive the control as the more neutral, non-partisan individual it was intended 
to be (MControl = .44). For Democrats, then, these results suggest that the control is not necessarily 
a true control and instead they infer that this “control” individual, who exhibits no overt negative 
qualities, is a member of their own party (Theodoridis and Goggin 2017).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average Perceived Partisanship of Picture Treatments with 95% Confidence Intervals 
by Respondent Partisanship 
 
Overall, these results provide suggestive evidence that people do engage in spontaneous 
partisan categorization when briefly observing the physical appearance and features of an 
individual. People can impute partisan identity from visual cultural symbols because of the 
cognitive association between party, partisan coalition groups, and these social group cultural 
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symbols. Furthermore, an individual’s willingness to categorize someone by party is not 
significantly affected by their own partisanship, and thus partisan categorization is not a reflection 
of the partisan identity of the perceiver.  
 
Impression Formation  
The results from above suggest that both Republicans and Democrats can use these visual 
manifestations of cultural symbols to engage in partisan categorization of individuals, and thus 
these visual features are recognized as partisan stereotypes. However, this does not necessarily 
suggest that all of these different partisan stereotypes will affect impressions of warmth and 
competence in the same way. As theorized above, these individuals are not only typical of a 
political party but also of social groups that vary in status and skill. As such, in order to gain a 
more complete picture of how these various partisan cultural stereotypes might affect one’s 
impression formation of someone, it is essential to understand the effect of each type of visual 
manifestation of partisan cultural stereotypes on perceived intent (friendliness) and capability 
(competence). 
To analyze whether respondents use friendliness and competence to differentiate between 
various stereotypical co-partisan and opposing partisan subtypes, I subset the data by respondent 
partisan identity in order to isolate in-groups and out-groups. Perceived Friendliness and 
Perceived Competence are both coded as dummy variables where 1 indicates friendly and 
competent (0 indicates unfriendly and incompetent), respectively.  
To get an initial assessment of how Democrats and Republicans differentiate various types 
of partisan cultural stereotypes along these two dimensions, I plot Perceived Friendliness against 
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Perceived Competence for all twelve treatments among Democrats, in Figure 3a, and Republicans, 
in Figure 3b. 
The results from Figure 3a suggest that Democrats rate stereotypical co-partisans more 
favorably along these two dimensions than stereotypical opposing partisans. In addition, for the 
majority of treatments, Democrats do not necessarily differentiate between friendliness and 
competent when forming impressions of stereotypical partisans. In general, the majority of 
treatments are seen as equally warm and competent, falling along the diagonal line that is 
bookended at the bottom left hand corner by Trump Supporter and in the top right hand corner by 
Hipster.  
 
Figure 3a. Stereotype Content Model Among Democrats 
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This general positive or negative perception, however, primarily applies to stereotypical 
“Republicans” (treatments that are bolded and italicized). Trump Supporter, Camo, Cowboy, and 
Union are all viewed as equally friendly and competent, in addition to being viewed as less warm 
and capable than the majority of stereotypical co-partisans. Suit is rated as significantly more 
competent than warm (diff: -.57, p < 0.00), a result consistent with perceptions of affluent or high-
income groups in other assessments of warmth and competence (Fiske et al. 2002). Preppy, on the 
other hand, is seen by Democrats as relatively high in friendliness (Mfriendly = .81) and competence 
(Mcompetent = .79) compared to other “Republicans,” however, this is probably largely a result of 
Democrats, on average, categorizing Preppy as a co-partisan.28 
When formulating initial stereotype impressions of individuals stereotypical of their own 
party, Democrats seem to differentiate slightly more along these two dimensions. Only Hipster 
and Hillary Supporter are perceived as true in-group members, equally high on friendliness and 
competence (Fiske et al. 2002). For the other three “Democrats,” there is some variance in the 
impressions of them. Professor is thought of as significantly more competent than warm (diff = -
.19, p <0.00), although high on both (Mfriendly = .72, Mcompetent = .92). This suggests that Democrats 
in the sample find Professor slightly more threatening than other stereotypical Democrats, which 
makes sense given the authority often attributed to professors. Conversely, Democrats think of 
both Hippie (Mfriendly = .95, Mcompetent = .51, diff = .44, p < 0.00) and Basketball (Mfriendly = .65, 
Mcompetent = .48, diff = .17, p < 0.00) as more warm than competent which suggests that Democrats 
take pity on both of these particular in-group subtypes. Compared to Hippie, though, Basketball is 
seen as about 30 percentage points less friendly. Overall, all stereotypical co-partisans are rated as 
                                                 
28 The mean paired difference between the two dimensions of friendliness and competence is in 
the Appendix.   
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friendly and only Basketball is rated as (slightly) less friendly than Cowboy, a stereotypical 
opposing partisan.  
Figure 3b depicts the perceived friendliness and competence among Republicans. From 
these findings, three main results emerge. Like Democrats, Republicans seem to form more 
positive impressions of individuals who are stereotypical of their own party compared to the 
impressions formed of individuals who are stereotypical of the opposing party. Cowboy and 
Preppy are seen as high-status individuals, rated equally high on friendliness and competence, 
whereas Hillary Supporter is seen as the lowest status individual, equally low on friendly and 
competent.  
 
Figure 3b. Stereotype Content Model Among Republicans 
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However, the similarities between Democrats and Republicans end there. Republicans are 
unique from Democrats, in this sample at least, in two ways. First, Republicans, on average, 
formulate more positive initial impressions of ex-ante stereotypical opposing partisans compared 
to Democrats, particularly along the dimension of perceived friendliness. While Democrats, on 
average, ascribe negative intention to several stereotypical Republicans – Trump Supporter, Camo, 
and Suit – Republicans, on average, see stereotypical Democrats as having positive, or at worst 
neutral, intentions. These results suggest that Republicans, compared to Democrats, perceive 
stereotypical opposing partisans as less cold, regardless of which social group their cultural 
symbols are associated with. This difference in perceived friendliness might be able to explain 
why Republicans are less likely than Democrats to discriminate against stereotypical opposing 
partisans in apolitical contexts. Republicans might simply view them as not competitive.  
Second, Republicans seem to distinguish more between friendliness and competence when 
forming impressions of various stereotypical co-partisans or opposing partisan, although slightly 
more for stereotypical opposing partisans. Indeed, Republicans’ mean ratings of friendliness and 
competence are more consistently significantly different across the 12 treatment photographs 
compared to Democrats (see Appendix C Table 3). Both Professor (Mfriendly = .58, Mcompetent = .8, 
diff = -.22, p < 0.00) and Suit (Mfriendly = .54, Mcompetent = .94, diff = -.4, p < 0.00) are viewed as 
significantly more competent than friendly, befitting of both of these stereotypical partisans’ social 
groups. They also view Camo, Preppy, Hippie, and Basketball as more friendly than competent, 
suggesting that for Republicans all four of these types of individuals are viewed as helpless and 
non-threatening stereotypical partisans, which may reflect attributes related to their social group. 
Particularly interesting, I think, is that Camo is included in this group given that this outfit was 
selected to represent “rednecks.” This group has been particularly central in the recent political 
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environment, as the subject of derogatory remarks from Democrats but the subject of empathy and 
pity at least in Republican elite rhetoric (Barabak and Duara 2016). Thus, perhaps, Republicans 
are less likely than Democrats to rely on their partisan perceptions when formulating initial 
impressions of friendliness and competence, but instead also incorporate aspects of these 
individuals’ social groups when formulating impressions of them. 
 
Partisan Visual Categorization and Social Evaluations 
 
 The previous study finds clear evidence connecting specific clothing choices and visual 
appearances to the stereotypical images people have of Democrats and Republicans. Study 1, 
however, does not explore how these visual partisan cultural stereotypes affect social evaluations 
of strangers. To assess whether and how these initial partisan perceptions shape attitudes and 
expressed behaviors, I contracted with YouGov to recruit a nationally representative sample of 
1,200 respondents. 510 respondents identified as Democrats (including leaners), 417 respondents 
identified as Republicans (including leaners), 225 respondents identified as pure Independents, 
and 48 individuals were not sure about their partisan identification. After completing an unrelated 
survey, respondents were randomly assigned to evaluate one of seven partisan pictures from Study 
1 on a variety of social judgment dimensions.  
 To examine the breadth of the effect of partisan discrimination, respondents were asked 
two attitudinal questions and two behavioral expression questions. Overall, this study assesses a) 
whether partisan discrimination occurs when evaluating complete strangers and b) the extent to 
which it occurs in various different types of social evaluations. Across all four types of social 
evaluations, I expect that respondents will express positivity towards someone dressed as a 
stereotypical co-partisan and negativity towards someone dressed as a stereotypical opposing 
  
84 
 
partisan, regardless of the respondent’s partisanship. It is simply mechanisms of in-group/out-
group prejudice that drive these expectations, but that in-group and out-group status are signaled 
by clothing styles and physical appearance.  
 
Attitudinal Social Evaluations 
 
 The two attitudinal dependent variables are Affect and Empathy. To measure Affect 
respondents were asked to rate their feelings towards the treatment individual using a traditional 
feeling thermometer. This variable was then recoded to scale from 0 (very cold) to 1 (very warm).  
The second attitudinal variable, Empathy, measures the extent to which respondents think 
that the individual in the photograph cares, respects, and understands her. In Kramer (2016), rural 
residents of Wisconsin frequently express these feelings when talking about Wisconsin urbanites, 
state level elites, and the liberal news media. These qualitative interviews suggest that a potential 
aspect of the urban/rural cultural divide is a lack of understanding, respect, and empathy. Partisan 
identity now seems to mirror this strong cultural divide, in that the daily concerns and interests of 
Republicans and Democrats are so vastly different that the two sides just do not understand or 
empathize with each other’s lifestyles or daily needs. I look here to test whether these feelings to 
misunderstanding and lack of empathy and respect also fall along a partisan divide.  
The question wording for each of the three intergroup resentment questions is “Thinking 
about the individual in the picture, in your opinion, do you think the following statements describe 
him extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all? [Cares/Understands/Respects] 
people like me.” The answers to each of these three questions scale quite well together with a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .94. Therefore, I created an additive index of the three measures, Empathy, 
which ranges from 0 (does not care/understand/respect people like me) to 1 (does 
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care/understand/respect people like me).  
Empathy and Affect scale relatively well together with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .77, however, 
I choose to analyze them separately. While they both might be measuring general positive or 
negative feelings towards co-partisans and opposing partisans, theoretically I think they are 
measuring slightly different concepts of positive and negative feelings. One is personal feelings 
towards an individual, Affect, and one is group level feelings of disrespect and empathy, Empathy, 
both of which I argue could be influenced by partisan identity of the respondent.   
I begin by looking at the difference in means of Affect across all seven treatments among 
Democrats, in Figure 4a, and among Republicans, in Figure 4b. Democrats feel significantly more 
positive towards co-partisans than the control and feel significantly more negative towards 
opposing partisans when rating an individual wearing an explicit signal of partisanship. Democrats 
rate Hillary 18 percentage points (p < 0.00) more favorably than the control and rate Trump 22 
percentage points (p < 0.00) less favorably than the control. Thus, explicit symbols of partisanship 
do influence how respondents feel about these complete strangers. Moving to the implicit symbols 
of partisanship, there is some evidence that these visual partisan cultural stereotypes affect basic 
feelings about a stranger, but this effect is not consistent across all partisan cultural stereotype 
treatments.   
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Figure 4a and 4b. Mean Level of Affect by Treatment with 95% CI 
 
Among Democrats, only Hipster exerts a significant effect on their feelings towards these 
strangers. Democrats rate the Hipster 9 percentage points higher than the control (p < .05). In 
connection with Study 1, which found that respondents see the Hipster as highly typical of the 
Democratic party, these results suggest that Democrats do in engage in some level of in-group 
favoritism based on perceived partisan affiliation. However, this is the only visual manifestation 
of partisan cultural stereotypes that significantly affects Democrats’ feelings towards strangers. 
For the three other treatments, the average feeling thermometers are suggestive of partisan bias in 
that the two “Republican” treatments are rated more negatively than the control and the one 
“Democrat” treatment is rated more positively than the Control but these three treatment effects 
are not significantly different from the control picture.  
Looking at Figure 4b, Republicans feel 17 percentage points (p < 0.00) more positively 
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about Trump compared to the control and 19 percentage points (p <0.00) more negatively about 
Hillary than the control. Furthermore, there is slightly more evidence among Republicans that 
visual partisan cultural stereotypes affect social evaluations of strangers. Republicans express both 
in-group favoritism and out-group derogation when evaluating stereotypical Republicans and 
Democrats, respectively. When exposed to an individual dressed in camouflage, Republicans rate 
this individual more positively than the control by 10 percentage points (p <0.05), engaging in 
perceived co-partisan favoritism. Conversely, when exposed to an individual dressed like a 
Professor, Republicans express out-group derogation and rate him 13 percentage points more 
negatively than the control (p < 0.00). Furthermore, the average feeling thermometer rating for 
Professor is statistically insignificant from the average feeling thermometer rating of Hillary (diff: 
-.06, p = .141). This suggests that for Republicans this implicit signal of Democratic partisanship 
stirs up statistically equivalent levels of disdain as explicit signals of Democratic partisanship. 
 Overall, there is some support that perceptions of partisanship via clothing style alter basic 
affect towards strangers along partisan dimensions. However, the effect of partisan cultural 
stereotypes varies depending on which partisan cultural stereotype is visually represented. Not all 
partisan cultural stereotypes exert an influence on basic affect.  
 Turning next to the difference in means analysis of Empathy across all seven treatments 
and control pictures, the results of these two models are in Figures 5a and 5b, respectively. 
Among Democrats, in similar fashion to the analysis of the affect measure results, the two 
explicit partisan treatments Hillary and Trump produce significant feelings of partisan bias. 
Democrats who received the Hillary treatment are, on average, more likely to think that this 
individual empathizes with people like them compared to the control by 0.16 (p < 0.00). 
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Conversely, Democrats who received the Trump treatment think that this individual is, on average, 
less accepting of and empathetic towards them by -0.21 (p < 0.00) compared to the control.   
Unlike the results of the feeling thermometer analysis, all of the stereotypical “Democrats” 
and “Republicans” also produce expressions of partisan bias on Empathy among Democrats. 
Democratic respondents who received the two stereotypical “Democratic” treatments, Hipster and 
Professor, think these individuals care, respect, and understand people like them by 0.11 (p < 0.00) 
and 0.07 (p < .10) more than the control. The in-group favoritism that occurs as a result of exposure 
to Hipster is statistically equivalent to that of Hillary (diff: .05, p = .176) as well. Furthermore, 
Democrats who saw the two “Republican” treatments, Camo and Suit, see these two individuals 
as significantly less empathetic towards and understanding of people like them by -0.08 (p < 0.05) 
and -0.10 (p < 0.05) compared to the control, respectively.  
Figure 5a and 5b. Average Level of Empathy by Treatment with 95% CI 
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Figure 5b shows that Republicans also feel some partisan bias when evaluating treatments 
on Empathy. Republicans think that, on average, Trump is more empathetic and understanding of 
them than the control by 0.17 (p < 0.00), and that Hillary is less empathetic of them than the control 
by -0.18 (p < 0.00). Republicans also express feelings of partisan bias when exposed to pictures of 
individuals who are stereotypical of the two parties. Republicans, on average, think that both 
Hipster and Professor are less likely to care, respect, and understand people like them by -0.09 (p 
< 0.10) and -0.14 (p < 0.00), respectively. However, only Republicans who saw Camo think that 
this stereotypical Republican empathizes with people like them (diff: 0.13, p <0.00) more than the 
control individual. Republicans actually think that Suit is less accepting of people like them. 
However, this effect is imprecisely estimated and insignificant. The negative magnitude of this 
effect might be due to Study 1’s results that suggest that both Democrats and Republicans perceive 
Suit to be relatively low in warmth and high in competence when compared to other individuals. 
Even though Suit is intended to be a Republican co-partisan, Republicans might weight the social 
group associations of Suit more heavily when evaluating this individual’s empathy and 
understanding of fellow Republicans.  
Overall, the analysis of both of these attitudinal variables suggest that while explicit 
partisan cues consistently affect both Affect and Empathy, the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes 
seems to be more pronounced when evaluating Empathy and feelings of group level acceptance 
rather than the basic measures of personal affect.  
 
Behavioral Expression Social Evaluations 
 
 The two dependent variables that measure behavioral expressions are Seat Distance and 
Family Marriage. Here, I test the extent to which this preference for interacting with a co-partisan 
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and distancing oneself from an opposing partisan (Deichert, Goggin, and Theodoridis 2018; 
Iyengar and Westwood 2012) translates into a preference for distancing (interacting) with an 
individual stereotypical of the opposing party (own party).  
Seat Distance measures the extent to which partisans would be willing to sit close to or far 
away from the treatment individual. Respondents were told to imagine that they were in a doctor’s 
office waiting room where there were seven seats in a row. They were also told that the treatment 
individual was seated in the seat furthest to the left. Respondents were then asked to choose a seat 
from the remaining six seats available from a stylized likert scale where the furthest left answer 
option, 0, indicated that the man was sitting there. This computerized technique of measuring seat 
distance is taken from McKinnon et al. (2011). From these responses, I calculated the number of 
seats between the seat the respondent chose and the seat where the treatment individual was seated. 
This variable, Seat Distance, ranges from 0 (sat close by) to 1 (sat far away).  
 Theoretically, Seat Distance is intended to capture how partisan bias might occur in day to 
day social situations with others. How people behave in these daily, minor interactions can have 
lasting impacts on intergroup relations as sheer proximity increases the likelihood of interacting 
with someone. If people choose to sit further away from out-group members, they are not only 
creating a physical distance between them and the other, but also decreasing the likelihood that 
interaction, by happenstance, occurs across group lines (McKinnon et al. 2011). However, since 
the scenario depicted is a minor social situation that does not require actual interaction or 
conversation, people might not care if they are sitting next to someone stereotypical of the other 
party, especially when compared to a more long-term and interactive social situation.  
 To measure how willingness to engage in a more intimate social interaction would be 
affected by partisan cultural stereotypes, respondents also answered a question about whether they 
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would be happy if this individual married into their family. Family Marriage ranges from 0 (very 
unhappy) to 1 (very happy). According to the Borgardus (1933) social distance scale, this measure 
of social distance, i.e. having someone as part of your close family, is the greatest amount of 
desired social proximity that one can express about another. Close family members interact 
frequently and these interactions tend to be more intimate, especially when compared to sitting 
next to someone in a sterile environment. Therefore, these two variables, Seat Distance and 
Marriage, measure how stereotypical partisan appearance can affect both day to day, voluntary 
interactions (i.e. Seat Distance) as well as more long-term, obligatory interactions (i.e. Family 
Marriage).  
To analyze the effect of visual partisan cultural stereotypes on Seat Distance and Family 
Marriage, I conducted a difference in means test on each of the dependent variables among 
Democrats and Republicans. The results of the difference in means test on Seat Distance is in 
Figures 6a, among Democrats, and 6b, among Republicans.  
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Figure 6a and 6b. Average Level of Seat Distance by Treatment with 95% CI 
 
Democrats, Figure 6a, express a desire to engage in partisan bias towards explicit partisan 
signals when selecting a seat. On average, Democrats sit closer to Hillary compared to the control 
by about -0.07 (p<0.10) and they, on average, choose to sit further away from Trump by 0.17 (p 
<0.00). While these results suggest that partisans approach and avoid co-partisans and opposing 
partisans wearing explicit partisan symbols, there does not seem to be evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that partisans also approach and avoid perceived co-partisans and opposing partisans, 
respectively. Democrats only seem to avoid Suit and express an on average preference to sit further 
away from this individual compared to the control by 0.09 (p < 0.10).  
This general pattern also occurs among Republicans. On average, Republicans choose to 
sit further away from Hillary by 0.21 (p < 0.00) and choose to sit closer to Trump by -0.10 (p < 
.05) when compared to the control. Republicans, also, seem to desire more distance between them 
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and Suit and on average sit further away from Suit than the control by about 0.17 (p < .01). 
Republicans’ treatment of this individual might revolve around other perceived social group 
memberships, like his class and wealth. As a result, Republicans’ avoidance of this individual 
might be a reflection of their attitudes towards him as a member of the wealthy, business class 
rather than him as a perceived co-partisan. 
 Looking next to how partisan cultural stereotypes affect a willingness to interact with 
someone in a more socially proximate scenario, Figures 7a and 7b show the difference in means 
analysis, among Democrats and Republicans, for Family Marriage. In the analysis of this 
dependent variable, I restrict the population of respondents to whites only. By limiting the 
respondents to white only, I reduce the potential bias of minority respondents who might prefer 
intra-race marriage.  
 Both white Democrats and white Republicans are significantly less happy if their close 
relative marries an explicit opposing partisan. White Democrats, on average, feel less happy if 
their close relative marries Trump by -0.34 (p <0.00). White Republicans, on average, feel less 
happy if their close relative marries Hillary by -0.22 (p < 0.01). Both white Republicans and 
Democrats feel happier if a close relative marries a perceived co-partisan as well. On average, 
white Republicans feel about 0.13 (p < 0.05) happier if their close relative marries Trump than the 
control. White Democrats feel on average happier if their close relative marries Hillary (diff: .011, 
p < .05).  
Moving from explicit to implicit signals of partisan identity, white Republicans and 
Democrats’ preferences towards marriage do reflect partisan bias. These expressions of partisan 
bias, for the most part however, are not significantly different from their levels of happiness 
expressed about the control. White Democrats feel happier when faced with evaluating Hipster 
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(0.71, p = 1.00) and Professor (0.64, p = 1.00) and less happy with Camo (0.55, p = 1.00) and Suit 
(0.58, p = 1.00) compared to the control (0.63), but none of these mean differences are significant. 
Likewise, white Republicans feel happier or equally as happy when faced with the prospect of a 
close relative marrying a stereotypical co-partisan, Camo is 0.64 (p =1.00) and Suit is 0.58 (p = 
1.00) and less happy with a potential Hipster (0.56, p = 1.00) or Professor (0.48, p < .05) family 
member. However, only the negative effect of Professor is significantly different from the mean 
value of Family Marriage when evaluating the control.  
Figure 7a and 7b. Average Level of Family Marriage by Treatment with 95% CI 
 
Overall, for measures of expressed behavior it seems that explicit signals of partisanship 
affect both potential short-term, voluntary interactions, Seat Distance, and long-term, obligatory 
interactions, Family Marriage. Visual partisan cultural stereotypes and perceptions of 
partisanship, however, have minimal effects on respondent’s behavioral expression in either of 
these types of interaction.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 Through the associations between partisan identity and the social groups in the partisan 
coalitions, people use the visual attributes and physical appearance of strangers to categorize them 
by political party, formulate partisan based impressions of them, and assess how to interact with 
and treat them. Thus, person perception and subsequent social evaluations are potentially imbued 
with partisan animosity before even interacting with someone simply because partisan identity is 
now a visible identity.  
 The first portion of this study validates the idea that aspects of one’s physical appearance, 
like clothing preference and their possessions, are now recognized as partisan stereotypes. From 
observing these visual partisan stereotypes, people can and do engage in partisan categorization of 
strangers. Across the entire sample, the majority of treatments that were ex-ante considered to be 
Democrat or Republican are categorized as such in a speeded categorization task. These results 
suggest that partisan identity may now be a visible identity, somewhat similar to race or gender, 
that individuals “see" when they simply look at someone.  
 While the probability that people spontaneously engage in partisan categorization may be 
more tied to contextual factors, like electoral cycle (Michelitch 2015), than race or gender, these 
results show that people do recognize visual attributes to be part of the partisan stereotype. When 
tasked with imputing partisan categorization, forcing the salience and importance of partisan 
identity, people see aspects of an individual’s physical appearance - what clothes they wear, their 
hair, or what items that they have with them – as easily available and highly informative in 
achieving this goal of quick partisan categorization. On top of relying on an individual’s obvious 
social group memberships – here white, male, and young – respondents perceive these mundane 
stylistic preferences as more informative of an individual’s potential partisan identity. In fact, 
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respondents seem to think that some of these stylistic preferences and physical features are just as 
informative of an individual’s partisan identity as actual partisan gear, i.e. wearing a Clinton or 
Trump campaign shirt.   
 Next, I assess how Democrats and Republicans form initial impressions of these 
stereotypical individuals through perceived warmth and competence. The results here suggest that 
in addition to generally positive perceptions of co-partisans and generally negative perceptions of 
opposing partisans, impressions of stereotypical partisans vary along these two dimensions. This 
suggests that partisan identity is not the only identity that plays a role in person perception. The 
specific social groups associated with the various types of each stereotypical partisan also play an 
influential role. For example, Democrats’ perception of Suit seems to incorporate both aspects of 
perceived partisan identity and perceived social group membership. Democrats rate Suit more 
negatively than Republicans (diff = .16, p <0.00), which reflects the partisan association of affluent 
individuals. On the other hand, both Democrats and Republicans perceive Suit as highly competent 
(diff = -.00, p = .64), which seems to reflect the social status of affluent individuals not partisan 
group members. This differentiation within types of co-partisans and opposing partisans suggest 
that not all stereotypical partisans will be treated equally, some will be pitied or extended 
compassion while others will be avoided or derided.  
 This differentiation not only has implications for how people feel and behave around actual 
various stereotypical partisans, but may also provide insight into what types of Republicans and 
Democrats people picture in their heads when they engage in partisan discrimination. It seems, 
from these results, that Democrats and Republicans might be thinking of only one or two types of 
stereotypical partisans, those that are perceived as low in warmth and competence, when 
expressing prejudice against explicit partisans. For Democrats, this might be someone like Camo 
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and for Republicans this might be someone like Hipster. Both treatments are seen by the vast 
majority of respondents as Republican (84%) and Democrat (87%), respectively, and are perceived 
as the least warm and competent stereotypical opposing partisans (though Republicans still 
perceive Hipster to be friendly and competent). As such, it might be fruitful to assess how people 
react when other information beyond only a partisan label is provided. Providing more information 
about an explicit partisan - their social group membership, hobbies and interests, or maybe even 
showing a picture of them, might alter people’s mental images of who this stereotypical partisan 
is and produce more nuanced behavior beyond basic in-group and out-group prejudice that has 
come to define interparty political and apolitical attitudes and behavior.  
 Beyond personal perceptions of who people are, these visual partisan cultural stereotypes 
can also affect how people feel towards and interact with others. Study 2 tests how these visual 
representations of partisan cultural stereotypes affect both interpersonal attitudes and expressions 
of behavior. I find that while explicit partisan symbols produce significant partisan effects on 
various forms of social evaluations, the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes is more focused. 
Specifically, when people see stereotypical partisans they consistently experience significantly 
greater perceptions of antipathy and lower levels of happiness if an individual stereotypical of the 
opposing party marries into their family.  
 Specifically, the relative import that partisan cultural stereotypes has on attitudes concerning 
respect, understanding, and empathy for people like me compared to affect potentially highlights 
some of the microfoundations driving partisan polarization today. These significant feelings of 
partisan resentment towards individuals stereotypical of the opposing party signal that Americans 
today not only live in two different cultural/political worlds but that they also perceive little to no 
respect or understanding across this cultural divide. Democrats view stereotypical Republicans as 
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people who neither understand nor care to understand them and what is important to them, and 
Republicans express this same resentment towards stereotypical Democrats. Furthermore, these 
differences in lifestyle, culture, and daily priorities can be clearly seen from simply looking at the 
visual, cultural partisan cues a stranger sends with their clothing. This perceived mutual disrespect 
across partisan lines further affects the extent to which people wish to interact with individuals 
who are stereotypical of the opposing party.   
 Across the results of Study 2, there are also two general patterns when it comes to the relative 
effect of explicit partisan signals and visual partisan stereotypes. First, partisans more consistently 
express animosity towards perceived members of the opposing party than favoritism and 
preference for perceived members of their own party. This difference also applies, in some cases, 
to the relative magnitude of bias against explicit opposing partisans and bias towards co-partisans. 
These results are not unique to this study. Throughout this dissertation, I find consistently stronger 
negative effects for stereotypical opposing partisan treatments than positive effects for 
stereotypical co-partisans. These results are also not unique to this dissertation. It seems that these 
results further bolster the claim that affective polarization is driven more by negative feelings 
towards the opposing party rather than positive feelings towards the in-party (Iyengar and 
Westwood 2014), and that people recognize more what they are not compared to what they are 
and act on this recognition.  
 Another general pattern of results across Study 2’s treatment effects, is the difference in the 
consistency of the effect of explicit partisan clothing and stereotypical partisan clothing. Explicit 
partisan clothing produces significant in-party and opposing party effects for both Republicans 
and Democrats in every type of social evaluation. The effect of stereotypical partisan clothing is 
not that pervasive. While one explanation for this difference could be that people do not perceive 
  
99 
 
partisanship when looking at someone dressed as a hipster or wearing camouflage, the results from 
Study 1 suggest otherwise. Not only are Hipster and Camo perceived as highly typical Democrats 
and Republicans, respectively, but they are also categorized as such in a statistically 
indistinguishable rate as the explicit Democrat and explicit Republican. Perhaps, instead of a 
difference in perception of partisan identity affecting the difference in social evaluations, the 
difference is caused by a perception of centrality of identity. Individuals who wear explicit 
campaign gear, in addition to signaling their partisan identity, might also signal that they care about 
politics a lot and that their partisanship and involvement in these respective campaigns means a 
lot to them. Thus, these explicit partisan symbols are cueing both partisanship and partisan 
intensity and potentially exacerbating the extent to which partisan discrimination naturally occurs 
in apolitical situations.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE FORMATION OF PARTISAN STEREOTYPES 
 
ABSTRACT: This chapter explores the process of partisan cultural stereotype formation. Drawing 
on theories of exemplar behavior and associative learning, I argue that partisan elites’ cultural 
preferences and cultural elites’ political preferences can play a role in the development of the  
cognitive connection between political parties and lifestyle choices. One recent example of this 
argument is Taylor Swift’s recent foray into politics. The first part of this chapter outlines these 
recent events and how Swift’s activities have shaped partisan perceptions of her and her fans. In 
the second part of this chapter, I present results from an experiment that tests this theoretical 
argument more rigorously. I find that the behavior of both cultural and political elites can transform 
previously apolitical cultural preferences into partisan cultural stereotypes.  
 
 
Every day, people make mundane personal choices – ranging from which car to drive to 
what to eat. As inconsequential as these activities may seem, individuals seize on them to draw 
out information about other people’s lifestyles, values, and priorities (Rentfrow and Gosling 2006). 
Indeed, in today’s politically polarized environment, people use others’ cultural preferences—such 
as listening to country music or driving a Prius—to make inferences about their partisan identity. 
In previous work, for example, I find that individuals systematically associate cultural preferences 
with specific political parties and, as such, are partisan stereotypes. Thus, despite the fact that 
partisanship is not a visible physical trait and people rarely discuss politics (Mutz 2006), 
individuals can use partisan stereotypes to make assumptions about people’s political character 
from their appearance or preferences and, thus, engage in partisan prejudice on a daily basis. Yet 
in order for citizens to use these cultural preferences as political signals, these cultural preferences 
must first become partisan. That is, citizens must develop a cognitive association between a 
cultural object and a party.  
One mechanism through which mental representations, or stereotypes, of groups are 
formed is through the behavior of group elites, either a single leader or collective of leaders (Smith 
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1998). These elites can serve as group archetypes, or representations of an ideal group member. 
As such, their behavior affects the perception of the group by those both inside and outside of it. 
For group members, the behavior of group leaders establishes group norms, clarifies group values 
and boundaries, and conveys their obligations as group members. For individuals outside of the 
group, the behavior of group leaders communicates the group’s values and shapes the perception 
of the entire group (Feldman 1984). For instance, Americans’ view of Russians shifted from 
“rugged, brave, and patriotic” to “fierce, aggressive, and fanatic” as Stalin’s authority expanded 
and Soviet-U.S. relations became hostile (Allport 1979, Buchanan and Cantril 1953). Through the 
behavior of the group leader, a general association between these aggressive characteristics and 
the social group “Russians” was established.  The group leader’s behavior not only shaped the 
image of the leader but also the entire group (Conover and Feldman 1984; Fiske and Linville 
1980).  
I argue that these same mechanisms can transform cultural preferences into partisan 
stereotypes. When a political leader expresses a specific cultural preference, Obama inviting the 
cast of Hamilton to the White House and performing with them, for example, a cognitive 
association between the preference and the party, as a social group, can take shape. Through 
classical conditioning, people can implicitly learn that perhaps Hamilton Fans are Democrats or 
that the Democrats, more than Republicans, like Hamilton. In a similar vein, when a cultural group 
leader endorses a politician, say Kid Rock endorsing Donald Trump, it may also facilitate a 
cognitive connection between the musician, his fans, and the Republican Party. Thus, through the 
behavior of either political or cultural group leaders, a cultural preference can become uniquely 
associated with one party, transforming the preference into a partisan stereotype.  
Celebrities can play a large and influential role in the behavior of their fans. Indeed, people 
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do tend to trust their favorite celebrities. Fans typically view their favorite celebrities as credible, 
trustworthy, and, in general, associate positive feelings with them (Hoffman and Tan 2013). These 
attitudes towards their favorite celebrities often have real effects on fans’ behavior ranging from 
increased consumption of celebrity endorsed products (Spence 1973; Till et al. 2008) to following 
celebrity health advice, sometimes even when it contradicts the advice of medical experts 
(Hoffman and Tan 2013).   
Due to the rise of social media and public relations, the intersection between celebrity 
culture and politics has expanded (Lawrence and Boydstun 2017). Certain celebrities have begun 
to use their access to a larger audience to wade into political territory, hoping to be a political 
influence for their fans (Street 2004). The extent to which celebrities engage in politics can vary 
widely from comedians Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert hosting political talk shows to celebrities 
like Kendall Jenner and Kate Hudson urging their fans to be politically active (Gonzales 2016). 
Other celebrities endorse candidates or parties and use their platform and popularity to specifically 
voice their own political opinion. For instance, LeBron James actively supports the Democratic 
Party. He has spoken at rallies for Hillary Clinton in the past, and most recently wore a Beto 
O’Rourke hat to a basketball game in San Antonio (Folley 2018). It is this type of celebrity 
behavior, I argue, that can lead to the formulation of partisan cultural stereotypes. LeBron 
expresses his support for the Democratic Party and people begin to associate this political 
preference with him and his followers. Through repeated pairings of these two objects, LeBron 
and Democrats, people will begin to stereotype LeBron fans and potentially NBA fans, more 
generally, as Democrats.  
But celebrities are not the only ones reaching out to the “other side” in this emerging 
relationship. Politicians frequently make their cultural preferences known simply by living their 
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life in the public eye or intentionally posting about their habits and preferences. In a speech in 
Michigan, Mitt Romney casually referred to the cars that he and his wife drive stating “I drive a 
Mustang and a Chevy pickup truck. Ann drives a couple of Cadillacs, actually” (Keith 2012). In 
the remark, through simply mentioning the cars that his family prefers he effectively 
communicated to the public that he was wealthy. He further established the connection between 
him, his supporters, and a certain level of wealth (Keith 2012). In another more famous example, 
Gerald Ford ate a tamale improperly, with the husk on, at a media event in San Antonio (Marshall 
2016, Popkin 1993). While this is not necessarily an example of a politician expressing a cultural 
preference, this specific event demonstrated that he had never experienced this type of food and 
implicitly signaled ignorance of the food, the culture, and Texans. This incident became a focal 
point of media coverage in Texas, and through repeated coverage could have potentially signaled 
to the public that the Republicans, President Ford, and Mexican food and culture are incompatible.  
Through the behavior of both celebrities and politicians, the public begins to form 
associations in their heads about what it means to be a fan of a celebrity or a supporter of a 
politician. They form cognitive associations between culture and partisan politics. This type of 
associative learning, through observing direct exemplar behavior or reading about it through media 
sources, can be bolstered through classical conditioning. The more frequently objects and 
evaluative criteria are paired, the stronger the cognitive association becomes between this object 
and evaluative criteria in long term memory (Olson and Fazio 2001). Exposure to these associative 
patterns can lead to formulations of certain attitudes about objects without individuals being 
consciously aware of how they were formed and lead to the development of strong associative 
networks that are activated automatically when exposed to the object. Repeated exposure to a 
group exemplar’s behavior can, thus, reinforce the association between a group and the evaluative 
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characteristic and further establish this characteristic as a facet of the group. The behavior of a 
group exemplar comes first, but through repeated patterns of associations strong group stereotypes 
can emerge.  
To build on the example of Stalin above, from repeated exposure to pairings of Russians, 
or Stalin in particular, and aggressive characteristics people can implicitly “learn” that Russians 
are aggressive without full awareness of how these attitudes are formed. As a result, Russians can 
be stereotyped as aggressive, hostile, and mean.  
Overall, I expect that when a politician publicly endorses (or rejects) a cultural preference 
or a cultural group leader publicly endorses a party, an association between the politician’s party 
and the cultural preference will begin to form in people’s minds. As a result, when confronted with 
an individual who likes the relevant cultural preference, people will rely on this cognitive 
association to make partisan based judgments about the individual (H1).  
To test this hypothesis, I first draw on a case study of Taylor Swift’s recent public 
endorsement of two Tennessee Democrats running for public office after she avoided politics for 
the previous portion of her career. Through this case study, I find that perceptions of Taylor Swift 
have shifted over time. When Swift was largely apolitical and silent about political issues in the 
United States, the plurality of the public perceived her as neither Democrat or Republican. Her 
endorsements have led to the development of an association between her and the Democratic Party. 
Second, I conduct an experiment to explicitly test for this causal process. In the experiment, I show 
that people rely on both the behavior of a cultural exemplar and politicians to engage in partisan 
categorization and stereotyping of a fan of the cultural exemplar. Overall, the behaviors of group 
exemplars can have significant effects on perceptions of the exemplar and the cultural group, 
resulting in the transformation of apolitical cultural preferences to partisan cultural stereotypes.  
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Taylor Swift’s Long Awaited Foray into Politics 
 
 On October 7, 2018, political news shocked the entertainment world and entertainment 
news shocked the political world. Taylor Swift, the famously apolitical pop star, finally expressed 
her political voice when she posted on Instagram that she would be voting for two Democratic 
candidates running in Tennessee, Senate candidate Phil Bredesen and Representative Jim Cooper 
(Mervosh 2018). While she had previously encouraged people to vote in the 2016 presidential 
election (Mervosh 2018) and courageously faced her sexual assaulter in court (Yahr 2017), this 
was the first time the pop star explicitly discussed where her partisan allegiance lies. Her 
endorsement prompted support from Democrats, a backlash from Republicans, and it potentially 
contributed to an unprecedented spike in voter registration. Swift established herself as an active, 
voting Democrat.   
 Before this emergence into the political world, Swift had been famously apolitical. Up until 
October 7, 2018, there was nothing but speculation about Swift’s political beliefs as she 
painstakingly avoided any sort of association with a political party. Neither her behavior nor media 
reports of her behavior connected her with the Republican or Democrat Party. She did not 
explicitly endorse President Obama or either of his opponents in 2008 or 2012. She did not speak 
or do anything related to the 2016 presidential election during either the primaries or the general 
election until election day when she urged her social media followers and fans to “…Go out and 
VOTE” (Framke 2016). She completely controlled her political image and did not explicitly align 
herself with either party in any election, and if she did speak about politics it was in relatively 
neutral language.  
Her lack of political expression even prompted a consternation, as individuals in the media 
and activist communities claimed that she was intentionally not expressing her views and using 
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her platform because she did not want to alienate any of her fan base, seeing as how she has both 
Democrat and Republican fans (Framke 2016). Her absence of behavior or political expression 
created an atmosphere where no partisan association with her and her fans existed. There was no 
association to learn. This resulted in a relatively apolitical and non-partisan view of her and her 
fans.  
In the Spring of 2018, prior to her foray into politics, I conducted a brief survey using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to measure how Taylor Swift’s minimal and neutral political behavior 
shaped perceptions of her and her fans’ partisanship. In the survey, respondents were asked to 
categorize a variety of celebrities and their fan bases by partisan identity. This list included Taylor 
Swift and her fan base. Respondents were asked to rate “Taylor Swift” and “Taylor Swift’s Fans” 
on a 7-point scale of partisan typicality, which was then recoded to range from 0 (very typical 
Democrat) to 1 (very typical Republican).  
The mean level of partisan categorization for “Taylor Swift” was 0.40 and the plurality 
(24.5%) of respondents categorized Taylor Swift as “Neither Democrat nor Republican.” 
Comparatively, Oprah Winfrey, a more politically outspoken celebrity, was given the mean 
categorization of 0.20 and the plurality (35%) of respondents categorized her as very typical 
Democrat.  
Respondents rated “Taylor Swift Fans” slightly more neutral than the popstar with a mean 
level of partisan categorization of 0.42. 27% of respondents rated Taylor Swift Fans as somewhat 
Democrat and 26% of respondents rated Taylor Swift Fans as neither Democrat or Republican. 
Comparatively, Oprah Fans were given a mean rating of 0.26 on the 0 to 1 partisan categorization 
scale and the plurality (31%) of respondents rated Oprah Fans as typical Democrat while only 14% 
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rated Oprah Fans as nether Democrat or Republican.29 
These descriptive statistics suggest that her previously neutral political behavior did indeed 
lead to a relatively neutral perception of her politics among the public. Furthermore, her behavior 
and repeated absence of partisan pairings spread to the public’s perceptions of her fans’ partisan 
identity as well. Both she and her fans were previously thought of as absent any political 
affiliations. That was until Swift became political.  
As expected, the responses following her declaration of support for the two Tennessee 
Democrats reflected partisan polarization. Democrats praised her decision to voice her opinions in 
favor of their party. Republicans were incensed. The National Republican Senatorial Committee 
disparaged the singer posting, “If you haven’t heard, multimillionaire pop star Taylor Swift came 
down from her ivory tower to tell hardworking Tennesseans to vote for Phil Bredesen” (Durkin 
2018). Republicans in the mass public posted things like “Taylor swift just ended her entire 
career…,” insinuating that her Republican fan base would stop listening to her music (Durkin 
2018). President Donald Trump even said he likes her music “about 25% less.” Repeated pairings 
of the pop star’s name with the Democratic Party are everywhere now. Not only are news media 
outlets reporting about her political attitudes, but people are actively searching for this information. 
Swift endorsed Bredesen and Representative Cooper on October 7th.  According to Google Trends, 
searches for “Taylor Swift” in the United States tripled overnight and increased fivefold by 
October 10th.  
To test whether this event and subsequent media coverage affected the partisan perception 
of Swift and her fans, I reran the celebrity stereotyping survey from the Spring of 2018 among 
                                                 
29 The distributions of the partisan categorization of “Taylor Swift” and “Taylor Swift Fan” are 
in the Appendix.  
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different respondents in November 2018. Again, 300 U.S. citizens over the age of 18 completed a 
battery of questions where they categorized celebrities and their fans on a 7-point scale of partisan 
categorization. The scale was recoded to range from 0 (very typical Democrat) to 1 (very typical 
Republican). 
 In this second iteration of the survey, the mean level of partisan categorization of “Taylor 
Swift” was 0.35 and the plurality of respondents (28.7%) categorized “Taylor Swift” as a 
somewhat typical Democrat. Overall, Taylor Swift is perceived to be slightly more typical of the 
Democratic Party after she endorsed the two Tennessee Democratic candidates for office. 
Associative learning, either implicitly or explicitly, seems to be occurring as the partisan 
association with Taylor Swift have slightly shifted in accordance to her behavior.  
This associative learning, however, has not yet extended to perceptions of her fans. The 
mean level of partisan categorization for “Taylor Swift Fan” in this survey, 0.42, was the same 
exact mean level of partisan categorization for “Taylor Swift Fan” in the previous survey that took 
place before she decided to become political. Furthermore, a plurality of respondents (30%) in this 
survey categorized “Taylor Swift Fan” as “Neither Democrat or Republican.”  
The minor shift in partisan perception of Swift and the lack of a shift in partisan perception 
of her fans might be due to the specific content of her endorsements. Her support was not overtly 
partisan. In both of her Instagram posts, she expresses support for specific candidates and not 
necessarily the Democratic Party in general. Furthermore, she primarily rationalizes her support 
for the Democratic candidate for Senate by talking negatively about the Republican candidate’s 
policies. These minimal results might also be the result of respondents’ lack of awareness. At the 
time of this second survey, Taylor Swift had only been politically active for slightly over a month 
and the extent of her political action was only two Instagram posts. She has not been politically 
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active for long and while the initial post did receive a lot of media coverage, her overall level of 
activity was minimal. It might simply take time for news to travel and for people to learn about 
her political opinions. Respondents simply might not know about her political involvement and 
support of the Democratic Party just yet.   
 
The Emergence of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes 
 
To ensure that people do know about the political behavior of celebrities and partisan 
politicians, I contracted with YouGov in July of 2018 to conduct a survey testing whether partisan 
stereotypes can form through the behavior of either cultural group leaders or party leaders. First, 
respondents read a hypothetical article about either a politician endorsing a celebrity or a celebrity 
endorsing a politician and answered a series of distractor questions about the article. Next, 
respondents read a description of a hypothetical fan of the celebrity and evaluated him on several 
political dimensions. Around 1,200 respondents completed this experiment, and all were 18 years 
or older, U. S. citizens.  
The study started with respondents randomly assigned to one of five vignettes where they 
read a hypothetical article about a) a politician (Democrat or Republican) who likes Mark 
Wahlberg, b) Mark Wahlberg endorsing a politician (Democrat or Republican), or c) an apolitical 
description of Mark Wahlberg.30,31 After receiving a vignette, respondents answered a series of 
                                                 
30 I chose Hillary Clinton as the Democrat group leader because she was the most recent 
presidential nominee for the party. I did not choose President Trump as the Republican group 
leader because he and other Republican Party leaders have engaged in publicly contentious 
battles which has created the public image of Republican Party in-fighting (Bolton 2017). I chose 
Mitt Romney instead, as he was the most recent presidential nominee for the party before 
President Trump. The wording for each of these five treatments are in the appendix.  
31 The actual treatments are in the appendix.  
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distractor questions about the article – how it compared to other news articles they typically read, 
the article’s length, and if they thought it was interesting – in an attempt to remove the explicit 
association of Mark Wahlberg and either the Democratic or Republican Party from the 
respondent’s short term memory (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989).  
I use Mark Wahlberg and his movies as the cultural preference in these treatments because 
he is publicly non-partisan and, thus, it would not be unrealistic for him to be connected to either 
party. Furthermore, people do not view him as distinctly associated with one party. In the celebrity 
stereotyping survey conducted in the Spring of 2018, I also asked respondents to categorize Mark 
Wahlberg and Mark Wahlberg fans by partisanship. Table 1a shows that Mturk respondents, on 
average, perceive him and his fans to be non-partisan, and Table 1b shows that the distribution of 
perceived partisan identity of him and his fans is relatively equal across Democrat, Neither, and 
Republican. 
Table 1a. Average Perceived Partisanship of Mark Wahlberg and His Fans 
 
 Mean Perceived 
Partisanship  
Mark Wahlberg 
 
.495 
Mark Wahlberg 
Fans 
.484 
Perceived Partisanship is a 7-point scale that 
ranges from 0 (very typical Democrat) to 1 
(very typical Republican).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
111 
 
 
Table 1b. Distribution of Perceived Partisanship of Mark Wahlberg and His Fans 
 
 Very 
Typical 
Democrat 
Typical 
Democrat 
Somewhat 
Typical 
Democrat 
Neither 
Somewhat 
Typical 
Republican 
Typical 
Republican 
Very 
Typical 
Republican 
Mark 
Wahlberg 
 
5.37% 9.06% 18.46% 34.56% 18.46% 11.07% 3.02% 
Mark 
Wahlberg 
Fans 
5.70% 9.40% 16.78% 38.26% 18.46% 9.73% 1.68% 
Perceived Partisanship is a 7-point scale that ranges from 0 (very typical Democrat) to 1 (very 
typical Republican).  
 
After completing this set of distractor questions, respondents then read a short biography 
about a hypothetical individual, Mr. Lange, who is a fan of Mark Wahlberg.32 Every respondent 
received the same biography of the hypothetical individual. Following this biography, respondents 
evaluated Mr. Lange on a variety of political dimensions. In the first battery of questions, 
respondents placed Mr. Lange on two policy positions: one economic issue, government spending, 
and one cultural issue, abortion. The order of these two questions was randomized in the survey. 
Next, respondents categorized Mr. Lange by partisanship and selected whom they thought Mr. 
Lange voted for in the 2016 election. The order of these two questions was also randomized in the 
survey. These four questions are the primary dependent variables and are used to measure the 
extent to which cultural preferences of individuals shape partisan categorization and stereotyping 
of said individuals.  
 
 
 
                                                 
32 This biography is in the appendix.  
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Partisan Categorization  
 
 I first assess how learning about the behavior and preferences of cultural elites and political 
party leaders affect how people perceive the partisanship of fans of the cultural elites. To test this, 
I conduct a simple difference in means test on the dependent variable Partisan Categorization. 
This dependent variable is seven-point variable that was recoded to range from 0 (very typical 
Democrat) to 1 (very typical Republican).33 Each of the five vignettes (four treatments and one 
control) are represented by dummy variables. Dem. Endorse and Rep. Endorse are the two 
treatments in which a Democrat or Republican politician, respectively, talks about how much they 
like Mark Wahlberg. Wahlberg Endorse Dem. and Wahlberg Endorse Rep. are the two treatments 
where Mark Wahlberg endorses the Democrat or Republican Party, respectively. Control is the 
control treatment that simply talks about Mark Wahlberg. The average levels of Partisan 
Categorization per treatment are below in Figure 1.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 The exact question wording for this measure is “On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is very typical 
Democrat and 7 is very typical Republican, which party do you think Mr. Lange is most typical 
of?” with answer options of 1- Very Typical Democrat, 2 – Typical Democrat, 3 – Somewhat 
Typical Democrat, 4 – Neither, 5 – Somewhat Typical Republican, 6 – Typical Republican, 7 – 
Very Typical Republican. 
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Figure 1. Mean Level of Partisan Categorization by Treatment 
 
Figure 1 shows that all four treatments significantly affect the partisan perception of Mr. 
Lange, Mark Wahlberg fan. The two treatments that feature a Republican politician, either Mitt 
Romney or the Republican Party, both significantly increase the average level of Partisan 
Categorization and the two treatments that feature Democrat politicians, either the party exemplar 
or the party itself, significantly decrease the average level of Partisan Categorization when 
compared to the control vignette. Thus, the actions of both party exemplars and cultural elites 
affect how a fan of a cultural elite is perceived politically.  
While both types of group leaders can influence perceptions of cultural group followers, 
the actions of the cultural group leader produce a larger effect size on the perception of cultural 
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group followers. The mean level of Partisan Categorization for Wahlberg Endorse Dem is 0.36 
while the mean level of Partisan Categorization for Dem. Endorse is 0.45, this difference in means 
of Partisan Categorization is 0.09 and statistically significant (p < 0.00). Similarly, Mr. Lange is 
categorized as significantly more Republican (diff: 0.06, p < 0.00) among respondents who 
received the Wahlberg Endorse Rep. treatment than respondents who received the Rep. Endorse 
treatment. In both instances, it is the actions of the group leader that more directly affect 
perceptions of the fan. When it comes to partisan categorization, it is not the political leaders that 
create the largest difference in partisan perception but instead the celebrities connected to the 
preferences.   
 
Voting Behavior 
 
In addition to the partisan categorization dependent variable, respondents were also asked 
to select whom they thought Mr. Lange voted for in the 2016 election. Respondents were given all 
six presidential candidates from the 2016 election to select from when making this decision, but 
since I am specifically interested in perceptions of partisanship I created two dummy variables that 
measure whether they think Mr. Lange voted for the Democratic presidential candidate or the 
Republican presidential candidate. Vote Hillary and Vote Trump are coded as 1 if respondents 
indicated that Mr. Lange voted for that candidate, 0 otherwise.34 The difference in means test for 
these two dependent variables are below in Figure 2a and 2b.  
                                                 
34 The actual question wording was “Who do you think Mr. Lange voted for in 2016 Presidential 
Election?” with answer options Darrell Castle, Hillary Clinton, Gary Johnson, Evan McMullin, 
Donald Trump, and Jill Stein.  
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Figure 2a and 2b. Mean Level of Trump Vote and Hillary Vote by Treatment 
 
Here partisan categorization extends to perceived vote choice. Compared to the control 
both Democrat treatments have a significantly higher percentage of Hillary Vote. Respondents 
who received Wahlberg Endorse Dem. and Dem. Endorse think that Mr. Lange voted for Hillary, 
the Democratic candidate, by 0.27 (p < 0.01) and 0.23 (p < .01) more than the control vignette, 
respectively. Conversely, those who received Wahlberg Endorse Rep. and Rep. Endorse think that 
Mr. Lange voted for Hillary by 0.19 (p < 0.01) and 0.10 (p < 0.01) less than those who received 
the control.  
The results from the difference in means of Trump Vote by treatment group inversely 
mirror these results. The two Republican treatments, Wahlberg Endorse Rep. and Rep. Endorse, 
increase the percentage of respondents who believe that Mr. Lange voted for the Republican 
candidate in 2016 by 0.24 (p < 0.01) and 0.10 (p < 0.01), respectively. While the two Democrat 
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treatments, Wahlberg Endorse Dem and Dem. Endorse, significantly decrease the percentage of 
respondents who thought Mr. Lange voted for Trump by -0.21 (p <0.01) and -0.17 (p < 0.01).  
Here partisan association extends beyond partisan categorization to perceived vote choice. 
While party and vote choice are indeed highly related in the polarized environment of today’s 
political climate (Bartels 2002), this question requires respondents to take perceived partisanship 
a step beyond categorization and make assumptions about how partisan identity might affect one’s 
political behavior – applying person perception to actual behavior. Furthermore, while Hillary 
Clinton was the Democrat that endorsed Mark Wahlberg in the Dem. Endorse treatment, Trump 
was not the Republican that endorsed Mark Wahlberg in the Rep. Endorse treatment. Thus, the 
fact that the results for Trump Vote and Hillary Vote are similar suggest that it is not necessarily 
candidate specific associations that respondents are cognitively “developing” as a result of these 
vignettes, and rather it is a connection between the party, including all of its members and 
exemplars, and the movie star.  
 
Issue Stereotyping 
 
 To further assess the extent to which a cognitive association is developing between Mark 
Wahlberg fans and a political party cognitive network, respondents also evaluated Mr. Lange on 
two issue positions. These two issue positions, Government Spending and Abortion, measure the 
extent to which partisan stereotypes are applied to Mr. Lange in both the economic policy realm 
and the realm of social policy. I chose one issue from each of the two dimensions of policy space 
in order to capture a broad picture of partisan stereotyping across types of issues. I also chose 
issues from both dimensions to assess, more generally, whether one policy space is more or less 
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cognitively associated with partisan stereotypes and the development of cognitive partisan 
associations.  
 To assess Mr. Lange’s position on the issue of government spending, respondents were 
asked whether they thought Mr. Lange wanted the government to provide more or less services on 
a scale from 1 to 7.35 This dependent variable, Government Spending, was recoded to range from 
0 (government should provide many fewer services) to 1 (government should provide many more 
services). To measure respondents’ perception of Mr. Lange’s abortion attitudes, respondents were 
asked to place Mr. Lange on the typical four-point abortion question which was recoded to range 
from 0 (most conservative position) to 1 (most liberal position) variable Abortion.36 The 
Cronbach’s alpha for these two issue positions is quite low at .28, so I analyze them as two separate 
dependent variables. This low measure of scale reliability preliminary suggests that respondents 
did not engage in similar levels of partisan stereotyping across these two issue dimensions.  
As mentioned above, respondents answered both of these issue position questions 
immediately after reading about Mr. Lange and before perceived party and vote choice. 
Furthermore, the order of this two question battery was randomized. The results for both of these 
                                                 
35 The specific wording for this question was: “Some people think the government should 
provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. 
Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it 
means an increase in spending. Where would you place Mr. Lange on this scale?”  
36 The specific wording for this question was: “There has been some discussion about abortion 
during recent years. Which one of the opinions below do you think best agrees with Mr. Lange’s 
view?” The answer options were: “By law, abortion should never be permitted”, “The law should 
permit abortion only in the case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger”, “The law 
should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only 
after the need for the abortion has been clearly established”, and “By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.” 
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difference in means tests are below in Figure 3, for Government Spending, and Figure 4, for 
Abortion.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average Perception of Government Spending by Treatment 
 
From looking at Figure 3, it is evident that there is not much partisan stereotyping on the 
issue of government spending. Only Wahlberg Endorse Rep. produces a significant difference 
from the control treatment in the expected direction. Respondents who received this treatment 
think of Mr. Lange as 4 percentage points (p < .10) more conservative on this issue than the control. 
The effects of all other treatments produce insignificant effects on the perception of Mr. Lange’s 
position on government spending.  
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Figure 4. Average Perception of Abortion by Treatment 
 
Conversely, respondents seem to engage in much more partisan stereotyping when it comes 
to placing Mr. Lange on the issue of abortion. Compared to receiving the control vignette, 
respondents who received either of the Republican vignettes think Mr. Lange holds more of a 
conservative view on this issue. Respondents who received the Wahlberg Endorse Rep. and 
respondents who received Rep. Endorse both think that Mr. Lange holds a 0.07 (p < .05) more 
conservative position on Abortion than respondents who received the control vignette. 
Respondents who received the Wahlberg Endorse Dem. treatment rate Mr. Lange’s position on 
Abortion as significantly more liberal by 7 percentage points (p < 0.05) compared to respondents 
who received the control treatment. Respondents who received the Dem. Endorse treatment think 
that Mr. Lange holds a more liberal position on Abortion than those who received the control 
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condition, however, this difference is not significant. Those in the control condition already 
perceive Mr. Lange to have a relatively liberal position on Abortion, so the insignificant effect here 
could be a result of this relatively liberal baseline.  
Overall, both the actions of cultural exemplars, here a movie star, and politicians can 
influence how fans of the cultural exemplars are politically perceived. However, the cultural 
exemplars seem to have a slightly stronger impact on the political perception of their fans than do 
partisan politicians. One explanation for this difference in effect is the group that is being 
evaluated. Since respondents are asked to evaluate people based on their cultural preferences, 
people are being evaluated as members of a cultural preference group. Perhaps the effect of 
partisan politicians would be larger if the partisan categorization and stereotyping questions were 
framed around the cultural stereotypes of partisans rather than the partisan stereotypes of cultural 
group members. These results suggest that one way in which cultural preferences can transform 
into partisan cultural stereotypes is through the behavior of cultural and political elites, and that 
the political behavior of celebrities plays an important role in how the public creates the mental 
images that are associated with the two parties.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Overall, this paper attempts to explain how cultural preferences transform into partisan 
stereotypes and how prima facie apolitical lifestyle choices become signals of partisan identity. 
Specifically, I argue that one of the mechanisms through which partisan cultural stereotypes 
develop is the behavior of group exemplars. When cultural exemplars endorse politicians or 
politicians express a cultural preference, cognitive associations between these two concepts start 
to form. Once these cognitive associations are developed, exposure to one of these connected 
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objects can result in the activation of the other. Thus, the behavior of group exemplars can explain 
why learning someone’s cultural preferences can potentially lead to partisan categorization, 
stereotyping, and, possibly, discrimination. People might not connect these cultural preferences to 
politics on our own, instead the exemplars of either parties or cultural groups have to explicitly do 
this for the mass public.  
Through one illustrative example and an original survey experiment, I demonstrate that 
both cultural figures, celebrities in both cases here, and political figures can facilitate the 
development of this cognitive connection. Taylor Swift’s comments took a previously apolitical 
pop star and transformed her into the perceived champion of the Democrat youth vote (Leighley 
and Nagler 2018). In the experiment, both Mark Wahlberg’s endorsement of a party and a partisan 
exemplar’s “endorsement” of Mark Wahlberg affected respondents’ partisan perception of a Mark 
Wahlberg fan on a variety of partisan dimensions. When respondents read a newspaper article 
about Wahlberg endorsing the Democratic Party or the Democratic Party endorsing him, they were 
more likely to think of the Wahlberg fan as a typical Democrat and vice versa with the Republican 
party treatments.  
The effect of the behavior of either cultural exemplars or partisan exemplars on partisan 
categorization is fairly pervasive across multiple indicators of partisan categorization. The effect 
on partisan stereotyping, however, is more selective. The results from the analysis of issue 
stereotyping preliminary suggest that partisan stereotyping might be stronger and easier when 
tasked with placing perceived partisans along social issues rather than economic ones. The 
cognitive connection between political parties and social issues simply might be more frequently 
activated, and, thus, more accessible than the connection between the two parties and economic 
issues.  
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This could partially be a result of the recent extension of partisan conflict into social and 
cultural policy. Since partisan conflict over cultural and social issues has emerged more recently, 
this specific policy divide is more salient than the partisan divisions in economic policy (Ellis and 
Stimson 2012). Furthermore, media coverage of cultural issues has recently surpassed media 
coverage of economic issues as measured through the Comparative Agendas project (The Policy 
Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, 2017). Thus, cultural issues, due to their 
relatively greater news coverage, might simply be more associated with the two parties in our 
current context. Through this process of associative learning, the strength of the cognitive 
association between the parties and cultural issues might make stereotyping partisans by cultural 
issues easier and more accessible.  
 There was a lot of media coverage of Taylor Swift’s public endorsement of the two 
Tennessee Democrats. Media outlets reported on her endorsement, the language, and how the 
public and politicians responded. However, some media outlets and commentators argued that her 
endorsement, by and large, would have little to no effect on the outcome of the election (Conte 
2018; Brice-Saddler 2018). This does not mean that Taylor Swift’s political expression was 
inconsequential though. On the contrary, the results of this paper suggest that her political 
expression, and more generally the intersection of culture and politics, are very consequential in 
the development of the mental images of the two parties. How celebrities, and more broadly 
lifestyle brands, express themselves politically and how politicians express themselves culturally 
can shape what cultural preferences the public associates with the two parties. We can see this 
more generally, through the emergence of political consumption and partisan consumption habits.  
Recently, we have seen celebrities and politicians’ behavior politicize consumption 
decisions. When Nordstrom dropped Ivanka Trump’s clothing line, effectively expressing their 
  
123 
 
dislike of her and her family, female Trump supporters closed their accounts and decided to boycott 
the retailer (Wolf 2017). When Taylor Swift declared her support for Democrats Bredesen and 
Cooper, some Republican fans stated they would stop listening to her music (Durkin 2018) and 
President Trump stated he likes her music “about 25% less” now. In both instances, the political 
actions of cultural figures and politicians are shaping the mental images we have of the two parties 
and what it means to be a good partisan member. Good Republicans, who support Republican 
politicians, do not shop at Nordstrom or listen to Taylor Swift because of their political views. To 
do so would be seen as hypocritical to their partisan group membership.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this research project, I argue that because a variety of different social groups have 
distinctly sorted into the two partisan coalitions (Mason 2018), apolitical preferences and cultural 
symbols of these social groups have the potential to be partisan cultural stereotypes. As a result, 
people can use these apolitical preferences to categorize individuals by partisan identity without 
knowing any political information about them. Furthermore, this categorization has downstream 
consequences. People form broad impressions of others as partisans rather than unique individuals, 
and use this perceived partisan identity to guide how they interact with and treat others in everyday 
scenarios. Overall, these apolitical preferences can be used to navigate the social world through a 
perceived partisan lens, avoiding those who are perceived as politically dissimilar and only 
interacting with people who are perceived to be similar and understanding.  
The results throughout this research project suggest that these everyday cultural 
preferences are cognitively linked to partisan identity. Across various different types of initial 
impressions of strangers, whether it is a “getting-to-know-you” scenario or simply looking at 
someone, individual across all of these studies used the cultural preferences, hobbies, music 
preferences, and clothing styles to infer partisanship. This cognitive association in long term 
memory is activated regardless of whether this association is measured implicitly or explicitly and 
regardless of whether people are asked to categorize single or clusters of cultural preferences.  
One way in which these cognitive associations are formed is through the behavior of group 
exemplars which can lead to associative learning just through observing these correlations in 
everyday life. People pay attention to the habits of celebrities and cultural figures, and as such their 
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political behavior can lead to the development of an association between their products and a 
particular party. Politicians’ lifestyle choices can also result in the development of associations 
between cultural preferences and the political parties. The supposedly innocuous and arguably 
inconsequential behavior of these two types of exemplars are ultimately important in the formation 
the mental images of what Democrats and Republicans are like.  
But why exactly do people focus on these cultural preferences in order to formulate 
opinions and impressions of others? These cultural preferences are easily attainable and highly 
visible pieces of information, but people also strategically select and use these objects to express 
who they are and what they believe. This strategic selection can be motivated by internal 
gratification and satisfaction, but also as a way to project a certain image to others (Gosling et al. 
2002). For instance, someone might wear a rapper’s shirt because they like the rapper, but they 
may also wear the shirt in order to communicate to other people that they like this specific rapper, 
enjoy rap in general, or support black culture, history, and rights. We innately recognize that how 
a person chooses to dress, how they describe themselves, and their preferred activities are parts of 
a puzzle that can help us create a broader picture of them. Thus, we are always looking for clues 
about what a certain person is like. It is just now these clues are cognitively associated with partisan 
identity and beliefs.  
Furthermore, because the current political divisions between the two parties seem to 
revolve around their cultural differences, these cultural preferences and symbols might be 
particularly salient cues about partisan identity. The cultural divide between the two parties seems 
to be at the forefront of partisan polarization and general political divisions these days. In one 
recent New York Times article, a Republican voter was quoted as saying “I’m troubled by how 
things are going culturally, I’m troubled by crime and the lack of moral fiber,” and he is not alone 
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in expressing this opinion (Badger 2018). Because of this primacy of cultural policies and 
divisions, these cultural preferences, unavoidable reminders of the specific and distinct cultural 
habits and beliefs of social groups in the two parties, might be particularly salient for people, 
currently. So, people might be more attuned to identifiers of cultural/political differences. In 
addition, cultural and social issues are considered to be relatively “easy” issues in that people have 
gut reactions to them and more stable, stalwart opinions (Ellis and Stimson 2012). Perhaps, by 
extension, these cultural preferences might also be “easy” partisan cues to decipher, and thus, 
people pick up on these easier pieces of information about others.   
Constant avoidance of and negative expressions towards perceived opposing partisans on 
a daily basis can facilitate the creation of two separate worlds, one of Democrats and one of 
Republicans, where there is no interaction and no contact between the two parties. To be a good 
political citizen, that is to be active and a fair member of the body politic, one must take part in a 
rational contemplation of the issues at hand and be a participant in the deliberative democratic 
process. This deliberative democratic process involves not only the discussion of issues with like-
minded citizens, but also dialogue with individuals that hold a broad array of political attitudes 
and positions (Cohen 1989). This deliberation requires that individuals treat others with equality 
and respect, which is facilitated by a certain level of open-mindedness among citizens (Mendelberg 
2002). If, however, partisanship continues to divide the public in these basic, everyday interactions 
then equality and respect for others and their ideas might never occur and the chances for 
deliberation deteriorate. These normative implications of partisan cultural stereotypes and the 
extent to which prejudice results from the categorization process can affect how the country moves 
forward from this era of polarization, as well as whether gridlock and conflict remains.  
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THE CONTENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF PARTISAN CULTURAL STEREOTYPES 
APPENDIX 
 
Instructions for and Screenshot of the Categorization Task37 
 
In this next task, you will be presented with a set of words to classify into two groups. The task 
requires you to classify these items as quickly as possible; going too slow may result in an un-
interpretable score. This part of the study will take about 3 minutes.  
 
The word we would like you categorize will be in the center of the screen, and the two categories 
available will be in the top two corners. One in the top right corner, and the other in the top left 
corner.  
 
To select the group in the top left corner, press the key 'f' and to select the group in the top right 
corner press the key 'j'. Keep your index fingers on the 'f' and 'j' keys to enable rapid response.  
 
When categorizing objects, please rate whether you think this characteristic is typical of 
Republicans or typical of Democrats. If you think this characteristic is typical of both 
Republicans and Democrats please select the group you think it is MORE typical of.  
 
When thinking about these characteristics please think about the political parties' cultural 
stereotypes and try not to base your thoughts on personal beliefs. 
 
 
  
                                                 
37 This language is taken from previous work on deciphering stereotype content (see Devine 
1989). In addition, work on stereotype content suggests there is minimal difference in the 
typicality of attributes when respondents are asked to make judgments based off personal beliefs 
compared to when respondents are asked to make judgments based off cultural stereotypes 
(Krueger 1996). 
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Experimental Treatments for SSI Study, Spring 2016 
 
“Republican” 
Treatment 
Michael Lange 
Day Job/Previous Job: Investment Banker 
Home base: The country 
 
When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes 
to go hunting. He has been a hunter since he was in high school and he still 
enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the woods and spend time 
hunting deer, duck or birds depending on the season. Outside of hunting, 
Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his 
wife. His favorite show is Duck Dynasty, which he tries to watch as often as 
possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching an 
action film. “We love to just relax and go to an action movie when we have 
down time. We love the fight scenes and the car chases, and we always feel 
satisfied when the hero beats the bad guys,” Lange said. 
“Democrat” 
Treatment 
Michael Lange 
Day Job/Previous Job: Professor at a local university 
Home base: The city 
 
When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes 
to teach yoga. He has practiced yoga since he was in high school, and he still 
enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the yoga studio and spend his 
time engaging in mindful, spiritual and centering meditation. Outside of yoga, 
Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his 
wife. His favorite show is The Daily Show, which he tries to watch as often as 
possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching a 
funny movie. “We love to just relax and go to a comedy movie when we have 
down time. We love to laugh and enjoy both physical and satirical humor, and 
we always feel amused watching the mischief," Lange said.  
Control 
Treatment 
Michael Lange 
Day Job/Previous Job: Mechanical Engineer 
Home base: The county 
 
When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes 
to go swimming. He has been a swimmer since he was in high school, and he 
still enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the lake or the pool and 
spend time either practicing or exercising in the water. Outside of swimming, 
Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his 
wife. His favorite show is SportsCenter, which he tries to watch as often as 
possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching the 
latest movie. “We love to just relax and go to the movie theater when we have 
down time. We love to get out of the house and go to the movies, and we 
always feel excited about seeing the latest picture," Lange said.  
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Appendix Figure 1a: Boxplot of Categorization Ratings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 1b: Boxplot of Typicality Ratings 
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Appendix Figure 2: Mean Categorization Time with 95% Confidence Intervals38 
 
  
                                                 
38 In calculating the mean categorization time for each attribute, the data was cleaned by 
eliminating all responses where categorization time < 300 ms or where categorization time > 2 
standard deviations from the mean. The results do not change when the categorization data is not 
recoded, and respondents still categorize the cultural characteristics just as quickly as the 
political characteristics. 
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Appendix Table 1.  The Effect of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes on 
the Components of Cultural Stereotype Application  
 
 Attribution of 
Partisan 
Consistent 
Stereotypes 
Rejection of 
Partisan 
Inconsistent 
Stereotypes 
 (1) (2) 
“Republican” Treatment 0.21*** 0.37*** 
        (0.04) (0.03) 
“Democrat” Treatment -0.28*** -0.40*** 
        (0.05) (0.04) 
“Republican” Treatment *  -0.02 0.02 
Co-Worker Scenario (0.06) (0.05) 
“Democrat” Treatment * -0.09 -0.02 
 Co-Worker Scenario (0.07) (0.05) 
Co-Worker Scenario 0.01 -0.04 
               (0.04) (0.03) 
Republican  -0.01 -0.01 
               (0.03) (0.02) 
Female -0.00 0.01 
               (0.03) (0.02) 
Non-White -0.04 -0.03 
               (0.03) (0.02) 
Education  -0.02 -0.04 
               (0.06) (0.05) 
Income  -0.00 0.01 
               (0.05) (0.04) 
Age: 18-29  -0.17* -0.07 
               (0.10) (0.07) 
Age: 30-39 -0.18* -0.08 
               (0.10) (0.07) 
Age: 40-49 -0.18* -0.04 
               (0.10) (0.08) 
Age: 50 - 64 -0.17* -0.05 
               (0.10) (0.07) 
Constant 0.37*** 0.16* 
               (0.11) (0.08) 
Adjusted R2 .19 .47 
N  1124 1124 
Both dependent variables are coded from -1 (Democrat) to +1 (Republican).  
OLS coefficients with standard errors below. 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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POLITICS ALL AROUND US: PARTISAN CULTURAL STEREOTYPES AND 
DISCRIMINATION APPENDIX 
 
Stimulus for Partisan and Cultural Symbols BIATs 
 
 Partisan Symbols BIAT Cultural Symbols BIAT 
Democrat 
Symbols 
 
 
 
HIP-HOP 
FOREIGN FILMS 
URBAN 
VEGANS 
Republican 
Symbols 
 
 
 
 
BIG BUSINESS 
COUNTRY MUSIC 
GOLF 
RURAL 
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Experimental Treatments for Candidate Biographies 
 
“Republican” 
Treatment 
Michael Lange 
Day Job/Previous Job: Investment Banker 
Home base: The country 
 
When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes 
to go hunting. He has been a hunter since he was in high school and he still 
enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the woods and spend time 
hunting deer, duck or birds depending on the season. Outside of hunting, 
Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his 
wife. His favorite show is Duck Dynasty, which he tries to watch as often as 
possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching an 
action film. “We love to just relax and go to an action movie when we have 
down time. We love the fight scenes and the car chases, and we always feel 
satisfied when the hero beats the bad guys,” Lange said. 
“Democrat” 
Treatment 
Michael Lange 
Day Job/Previous Job: Professor at a local university 
Home base: The city 
 
When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes 
to teach yoga. He has practiced yoga since he was in high school, and he still 
enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the yoga studio and spend his 
time engaging in mindful, spiritual and centering meditation. Outside of yoga, 
Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his 
wife. His favorite show is The Daily Show, which he tries to watch as often as 
possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching a 
funny movie. “We love to just relax and go to a comedy movie when we have 
down time. We love to laugh and enjoy both physical and satirical humor, and 
we always feel amused watching the mischief," Lange said.  
Control 
Treatment 
Michael Lange 
Day Job/Previous Job: Mechanical Engineer 
Home base: The county 
 
When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes 
to go swimming. He has been a swimmer since he was in high school, and he 
still enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the lake or the pool and 
spend time either practicing or exercising in the water. Outside of swimming, 
Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his 
wife. His favorite show is SportsCenter, which he tries to watch as often as 
possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching the 
latest movie. “We love to just relax and go to the movie theater when we have 
down time. We love to get out of the house and go to the movies, and we 
always feel excited about seeing the latest picture," Lange said.  
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Experimental Treatments for Doctor Biographies 
 
“Republican” 
Treatment 
Brock Jones 
Home base: Charleston, SC 
 
When not practicing medicine, Brock Jones likes to go golfing and get out to 
his ranch as much as possible. He has been a golfer since he was in high 
school and he still enjoys it today. "I just love to drive the truck out to the 
country club and play golf with my friends", Jones said. It is peaceful, yet 
challenging, and he likes to hang out in the card room playing poker 
afterwards. When he has a long weekend, Jones and his wife like to take 
advantage of the break and go out to their ranch for a brief vacation. They love 
to take the family to the country, take care of their animals and enjoy he open 
space. Jones also likes to unwind by going on dates with his wife. When he 
and his wife go out, they typically end up going to a country music concert, "I 
am a big fan of country music because I grew up on artists like Garth Brooks 
and Dwight Yoakum." They also often stop by their favorite local restaurant, 
"We are both big fans of steak, and there is this little place in town that we 
both love because of the great quality of meat." 
“Democrat” 
Treatment 
Liam Jones 
Home base: Boston, MA 
 
When not practicing medicine, Liam Jones likes to go rock climbing and travel 
as much as possible. He has been a rock climber since he was in high school 
and he still enjoys it today. "I just love to drive the Subaru out to the local 
national parks and go rock climbing with my friends", Jones said. It is 
peaceful, yet challenging, and he likes being out in nature afterwards. When he 
has a long weekend, Jones and his wife like to take advantage of the break and 
travel to a foreign country for a brief vacation. They love to travel with the 
family, learn about different cultures and experience other ways of life. Jones 
also likes to unwind by going on dates with his wife. When he and his wife go 
out, they typically end up going to a hip-hop concert, "I am a big fan of rap 
and R & B because I grew up on artists like Nas and De La Soul." They also 
often stop by their favorite local restaurant, "We are both vegans and there is 
this little place in town that we both love because of the great quality of veggie 
burgers." 
Control 
Treatment 
Robert Jones 
Home base: Harrisburg, PA 
 
When not practicing medicine, Robert Jones likes to go running and catch up 
on errands and repairs as much as possible. He has been a runner since he was 
in high school and he still enjoys it today. "I just love to drive the car out to the 
local running trail and go running with my friends", Jones said. It is peaceful, 
yet challenging, and he likes to exercise to relieve stress and stay in shape. 
When he has a long weekend, Jones and his wife like to take advantage of the 
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break and get errands done and do house repairs. They like to work as a 
family, running errands and repairing the house. Jones also likes to unwind by 
going on dates with his wife. When he and his wife go out, they typically end 
up going to a music concern, "I am a big fan of music because I grew up on all 
different types of music!" They also typically stop by a local Italian restaurant, 
"We are both bad cooks and there are a lot great restaurants in town that we 
both love because of their great quality of Italian food."  
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Experimental Treatments for Intern Biographies 
 
“Republican” 
Treatment 
Kyle Williams 
Home base: Alabama 
 
When not interning, Kyle Williams likes to relax by watching sports. His 
favorite sport to watch is NASCAR. He likes to watch the Indy 500 and races 
at the Texas Motor Speedway, but tries to catch as many races as possible. His 
favorite drivers are Kyle Busch and Jimmie Johnson. Outside of watching 
NASCAR, Williams likes to unwind by doing fraternity events, listening to 
music and hanging out with his girlfriend. He has been a member of his 
fraternity since he was a freshman, and enjoys the opportunity to form life 
long bonds with friends and do charity work for the community. On a typical 
night, his girlfriend will come over and they will just end up hanging out at his 
house: listening to class rock (i.e. Lynyrd Skynyrd or Van Halen), ordering 
food from either the local barbecue restaurant and watching Netflix or cable.  
“Democrat” 
Treatment 
Julian Williams 
Home base: California 
 
When not interning, Julian Williams likes to relax by watching sports. His 
favorite sport to watch is soccer. He likes to watch the European and Latin 
American leagues, but tries to catch as many games as possible. His favorite 
teams are a Mexican team named Chivas and the England National Team. 
Outside of watching soccer, Williams likes to unwind by working at his 
universities indie radio station, listening to music and hanging out with his 
girlfriend. He has been a member of his universities independent radio station 
since he was a freshman, and he enjoys the opportunity to meet local bands 
and see touring bands to play live in the studio. On a typical night, he and his 
girlfriend typically end up hanging out at home: listening to new indie or 
alternative music (i.e. Sufjan Stevens and DIIV), ordering food from either the 
local Indian or Vietnamese restaurant, and watching Netflix or cable.  
Control 
Treatment 
James Williams 
Home base: Ohio 
 
When not interning, James Williams likes to relax by watching sports. His 
favorite sport to watch is basketball. He likes to watch both NBA and college 
basketball, and tries to catch as many games as possible. His favorite teams are 
the Cleveland Cavaliers and Ohio State's basketball team. Outside of watching 
basketball, Williams likes to unwind by playing intramural football, listening 
to music, and hanging out with his girlfriend. He has been playing intramural 
sports since he was a freshman, and enjoys the opportunity to play even 
though he isn't very good. On a typical night after interning, he and his 
girlfriend will typically end up hanging out a home: listening to new rock 
music, ordering food from a local restaurant and watching Netflix or cable.  
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Appendix Table 1: The Mediating Effect of Perceived In-Party in the Non-Partisan Electoral 
Context 
 
 Vote Choice Perceived  
In-Party 
Vote 
Choice 
In-Party  0.07*** 0.69*** -0.05 
Treatment (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Out-Party  -0.13*** -0.49*** -0.05 
Treatment (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Perceived    0.17*** 
In-Party   (0.04) 
Republicans 0.09*** 0.29*** 0.04 
               (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Female -0.04 0.02 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Non-White -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
               (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Intercept 0.44*** -0.23** 0.48*** 
               (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.68 0.19 
N  316 316 316 
All Dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate more positive social 
evaluation. OLS coefficients with standard errors below. 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 2.  The Mediating Effect of Perceived In-Party in the Doctor Context 
 
 Doctor Visit Doctor Comfort  
 Doctor 
Visit 
Perceived 
In-Party  
Doctor 
Visit 
Doctor 
Comfort 
Perceived 
In-Party  
Doctor 
Comfort 
In-Party  -0.02 0.50*** -0.13*** 0.05 0.50*** -0.05 
Treatment (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Out-Party  -0.19*** -0.68*** -0.06 -0.11*** -0.68*** -0.01 
Treatment (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Perceived    0.20***   0.17*** 
In-Party   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Republicans -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Female 0.01 0.05 -0.00 -0.05** 0.05 -0.06** 
               (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Non-White -0.10*** -0.06 -0.08*** -0.07** -0.06 -0.05* 
               (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Intercept 0.85*** 0.14** 0.83*** 0.79*** 0.14** 0.78*** 
               (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.66 0.21 0.08 0.66 0.14 
N  316 316 316 334 316 316 
All Dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate more positive social 
evaluation. OLS coefficients with standard errors below. 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 3.  The Mediating Effect of Perceived In-Party in the Intern Context 
 
 Recommend Social Proximity 
 Intern 
Recommend 
Perceived 
In-Party  
Intern 
Recommend 
Social 
Proximity 
Perceived 
In-Party  
Social 
Proximity 
In-Party  0.02 0.41*** -0.09** 0.04 0.41*** -0.07*** 
Treatment (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Out-Party  -0.14*** -0.58*** -0.03 -0.13*** -0.58*** -0.01 
Treatment (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Perceived    0.21***   0.23*** 
In-Party   (0.04)   (0.03) 
Republicans 0.01 -0.09** 0.02 -0.00 -0.09** 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Female -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.00 
               (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Non-White -0.07** -0.06 -0.05* -0.06*** -0.06 -0.05** 
               (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Intercept 0.73*** 0.09** 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.09** 0.71*** 
               (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.60 0.15 0.11 0.60 0.25 
N  334 316 316 334 316 316 
All Dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate more positive social 
evaluation. OLS coefficients with standard errors below. 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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LOOKS LIKE A DEMOCRAT: PARTISAN VISUAL CATEGORIZATION AND ITS 
EFFECT ON IMPRESSION FORMATION AND DAILY INTERACTIONS APPENDIX 
 
Task Instructions and Categorization Question Wording 
 
Task Instructions.  
 
You will be presented with three sets of 12 pictures and be asked to classify each set by a specific 
attribute.  
 
You will have 3 seconds to view and classify each picture so please pay attention. The survey page 
will automatically advance to the next page after 3 seconds. This process will occur for each picture 
until you have completed the three sets of 12 pictures.  
 
Categorization Question Wording 
 
Attribute Question Wording 
Friendly Do you think he is friendly or unfriendly? 
 
Competent Do you think he is competent or incompetent? 
 
Partisanship Do you think he is a Republican or a Democrat? 
 
 
 
  
  
152 
 
Treatment Photos 
 
Control 
 
Hillary Supporter 
 
Union 
 
Hippie 
 
Hipster 
 
Basketball 
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Professor 
 
Trump Supporter 
 
Camo 
 
Cowboy 
 
Preppy 
 
Suit 
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Appendix Table 1. Average Perceived Partisanship for each Photograph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Treatment 
Condition 
Perceived 
Partisanship 
Lower 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Upper 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Trump Supporter 0.08 0.05 0.11 
Cowboy 0.13 0.10 0.17 
Camo 0.16 0.12 0.20 
Union 0.23 0.18 0.27 
Suit 0.23 0.18 0.27 
Preppy 0.61 0.55 0.66 
Control 0.62 0.56 0.67 
Basketball 0.67 0.63 0.72 
Professor 0.74 0.69 0.78 
Hipster 0.87 0.83 0.90 
Hippie 0.87 0.84 0.91 
Hillary Supporter 0.92 0.89 0.94 
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Appendix Table 2. Perceived Partisanship by Respondent Partisan Identity 
 
 Republicans Democrats Difference 
Trump Supporter .09 .06 .03 
Cowboy .21 .11 .10*** 
Camo .15 .16 -.01 
Union .16 .27 -.10 
Suit .23 .24 -.01 
Preppy .6 .61 -.01 
Control .44 .71 .00*** 
Basketball .65 .70 -.06 
Professor .68 .77 -.09 
Hipster .80 .90 -.11 
Hippie .82 .90 -.08 
Hillary Supporter .91 .93 -.02 
Difference in means test. The significance level for every treatment is a one tailed t-test, since I had  
theoretical expectation that partisans would be more likely to categorize stereotypical opposing  
partisans. The significance level for the control is a two-tailed test since there was no theoretical  
expectation for the direction. Perceived Partisanship is coded as 0 (Republican) and 1 (Democrat).   
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Appendix Table 3. Perceived Friendliness and Perceived Competence by Respondent 
Partisanship 
These are two-tailed difference in means tests. Perceived Friendliness and Perceived Competences are both coded       
as 0 (Unfriendly/Incompetent) and 1 (Friendly/Competent).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Democrats Republicans 
 Friendliness Competence Diff Friendliness Competence Diff 
Trump 
Supporter 
.22 .27 -.05 .77 .78 -.01 
Cowboy .69 .58 .10*** .84 .69 .15*** 
Camo .43 .37 .05 .7 .54 .16*** 
Union .72 .72 0 .72 .71 .01 
Suit .38 .95 -.57*** .54 .94 -.4*** 
Preppy .81 .79 .02 .82 .71 .11*** 
Control .79 .76 .04 .8 .7 .1** 
Basketball .65 .48 .17*** .62 .41 .21*** 
Professor -.20 -.347 -.19*** .58 .8 -.22*** 
Hipster .87 .83 .04 .7 .63 .07 
Hippie .95 .51 .44*** .89 .42 .47*** 
Hillary 
Supporter 
.84 .82 .02 .53 .48 .05 
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THE FORMATION OF PARTISAN STEREOTYPES APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table 1a. Distribution of Partisan Categorization for “Taylor Swift” and “Taylor Swift 
Fan”, Spring 2018 Celebrity Stereotyping Survey   
 
 Very 
Typical 
Democrat 
Typical 
Democrat 
Somewhat 
Typical 
Democrat 
Neither 
Somewhat 
Typical 
Republican 
Typical 
Republican 
Very 
Typical 
Republican 
Taylor 
Swift 
 
9.60% 19.54% 23.84% 24.50% 13.91% 5.96% 2.65% 
Taylor 
Swift 
Fan 
 
7.28% 16.23% 27.48% 25.50% 14.24% 7.95% 1.32% 
 
Appendix Table 1b. Distribution of Partisan Categorization for “Taylor Swift” and “Taylor Swift 
Fan”, Fall 2018 Celebrity Stereotyping Survey   
 
 Very 
Typical 
Democrat 
Typical 
Democrat 
Somewhat 
Typical 
Democrat 
Neither 
Somewhat 
Typical 
Republican 
Typical 
Republican 
Very 
Typical 
Republican 
Taylor 
Swift 
 
11.95% 26.28% 28.67% 16.38% 9.22% 5.46% 2.05% 
Taylor 
Swift Fan 
 
6.48% 19.45% 22.53% 29.69% 12.29% 8.53% 1.02% 
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Experimental Treatments For YouGov Stereotype Formation Survey, Summer 2018 
 
Wahlberg Endorses 
Democrat  
Mark Wahlberg Supported the Democratic Party   
 
The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that 
Mark Wahlberg, the 46-year-old movie mega-star, donated 
$5,000 to the Democratic National Committee in 2016.  
 
This is the first public report about the star’s political 
preferences. According to one fan, however, his supporters 
have known about his politics for a while. He will sometimes 
post information about the Democratic Party on his website 
or send out information about the Party through his emails to 
fans. 
 
The movie star, primarily known for his popular movies, is 
also known for his ability to set trends among his loyal fan 
base. Not only have his fans consistently seen and bought his 
films, but they have also fully embraced his lifestyle brand. 
When he posts links on social media, they are regularly 
copied and reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw 
a long-term spike in attendance after he was seen there a 
couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose 
to get a golden Labrador retriever for his family because the 
movie star owned one. 
Wahlberg Endorses 
Republican 
Mark Wahlberg Supported the Republican Party   
 
The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that 
Mark Wahlberg, the 46-year-old movie mega-star, donated 
$5,000 to the Republican National Committee in 2016.  
 
This is the first public report about the star’s political 
preferences. According to one fan, however, his supporters 
have known about his politics for a while. He will sometimes 
post information about the Republican Party on his website 
or send out information about the Party through his 
subscription email service.  
 
The movie star, primarily known for his popular movies, is 
also known for his ability to set trends among his loyal fan 
base. Not only have his fans consistently seen and bought his 
films, but they have also fully embraced his lifestyle brand. 
When he posts links on social media, they are regularly 
copied and reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw 
a long-term spike in attendance after he was seen there a 
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couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose 
to get a golden Labrador retriever for his family because the 
movie star owned one. 
 
Democrat Endorses 
Wahlberg 
Democrat Hillary Clinton Loves Mark Wahlberg Movies 
 
The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that one 
of Hillary Clinton’s favorite actors is Mark Wahlberg. 
Clinton frequently watches Wahlberg’s films with her 
family. 
 
This is the first public report about the Democratic 
politician’s interest in Wahlberg’s films. According to one 
fan, however, her supporters have known about her movie 
tastes for a while. She will sometimes post information about 
Mark Wahlberg movies on her website or send out 
information about his movies through her subscription email 
service. 
 
The Democratic politician, primarily known for her political 
service, is also known for her ability to set trends among her 
loyal fan base. Not only have her Democratic supporters 
consistently bought her books and attended her events, but 
they have also fully embraced her lifestyle brand. When she 
posts links on social media, they are regularly copied and 
reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw a long-term 
spike in attendance after she was seen there a couple of 
times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose to get a 
chocolate Labrador retriever for his family because the 
Democratic politician owned one. 
Republican Endorses 
Wahlberg 
Republican Mitt Romney Loves Mark Wahlberg Movies  
 
The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that one 
of Mitt Romney’s favorite actors is Mark Wahlberg. Romney 
frequently watches Wahlberg’s films with his family.  
 
This is the first public report about the Republican 
politician’s interest in Wahlberg’s films. According to one 
fan, however, his supporters have known about his movie 
tastes for a while. He will sometimes post information about 
Mark Wahlberg movies on his website or send out 
information about his movies through his subscription email 
service. 
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The Republican politician, primarily known for his political 
service, is also known for his ability to set trends among his 
loyal fan base. Not only have his Republican supporters 
consistently bought his books and attended his events, but 
they have also fully embraced his lifestyle brand. When he 
posts links on social media, they are regularly copied and 
reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw a long-term 
spike in attendance after he was seen there a couple of times. 
One supporter even mentioned that he chose to get an Irish 
setter for his family because the Republican politician owned 
one. 
Wahlberg Control Mark Wahlberg Supported National Charities 
 
The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that 
Mark Wahlberg, the 46-year-old movie mega-star, donated 
$5,000 to national charities in 2016.  
 
This is the first public report about the star’s charity 
donations. According to one fan, however, his supporters 
have known about his contributions for a while. He will 
sometimes post information about charities on his website or 
send out information through his subscription email service. 
 
The movie star, primarily known for his popular movies, is 
also known for his ability to set trends among his loyal fan 
base. Not only have his fans consistently seen and bought his 
films, but they have also fully embraced his lifestyle brand. 
When he posts links on social media, they are regularly 
copied and reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw 
a long-term spike in attendance after he was seen there a 
couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose 
to get a Labrador Retriever for his family because the movie 
star owned one. 
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Biography of Mr. Lange for YouGov Stereotype Formation Survey, Summer 2018 
 
Mark Wahlberg Fan Michael Lange 
 
During the weekend, Michael Lange likes to go running and catch up 
on errands and repairs. He has been a runner since he was in high 
school and he still enjoys running on trails with friends and family 
today. Jones and his wife also like to relax on the weekends, run 
errands, and go see movies. “Our weeks are so busy, that my wife and I 
like to unwind during the weekends. We relax, run errands, and try to 
see the latest movie. We are big Mark Wahlberg fans and have been for 
a long time. We really enjoy his movies. From The Perfect Storm to 
The Departed, we think they are all super entertaining.”  
 
 
 
 
